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Reconciling Federal Asset Forfeitures
and Drug Offense Sentencing
Sandra Guerra*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 13, 1990, Richard Lyle Austin met a police agent at
Austin's auto body shop. The two men agreed that Austin would
sell the agent some cocaine. Austin walked from the shop to his
mobile home and returned with two grams of cocaine that he
intended to sell to the agent. Austin was arrested. The next
day, law enforcement authorities searched the mobile home and
auto body shop and recovered "small amounts of marijuana and
cocaine, a .22 caliber revolver, drug paraphernalia, and approximately $4,700 in cash."1
Until the "war on drugs" reforms of the 1980s, this offender
would have faced only moderately serious punishment. 2 These
facts do not suggest that Austin was a "drug kingpin" or even a
mid-level trafficker. By all accounts, Austin was a small-time,
street-level dealer. For his criminal misdeeds, a South Dakota
state court convicted Austin of possession with intent to sell cocaine and sentenced him to seven years incarceration. 3 In other
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. Assistant District Attorney, New York County (Manhattan) 1988-90; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1988. The author owes a debt of gratitude to Irene Merker Rosenberg
and David Crump of the University of Houston Law Center; Deborah Young of
Emory Law School; Ronald F. Wright, Jr. of Wake Forest Law School; and Jamie Dershowitz for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
For their advice and support in the writing of this Article, the author thanks
Daniel J. Freed of Yale Law School and Marc L. Miller of Emory Law School.
The author also wishes to thank Rene S. Gonzalez, Carol Miller, Dana Desenberg, Michael Catania, and Kathleen Pekny for their research assistance.
1. Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993). Although police
found a revolver in the home, id., there is no indication in either the Supreme
Court or Eighth Circuit cases that Austin was considered dangerous. Id.;
United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992).
2. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 prescribed some of the the harshest
drug offense penalties to date. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); see
Steven Wisotski, Crackdown: The Emerging "DrugException" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HAST. L.J. 889, 904 (1987).
3. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2803.
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words, the sentencing court determined that seven years was
adequate punishment for the crime. Yet after his conviction, the
federal government also initiated civil forfeiture proceedings in
order to seize both his mobile home and his auto body shop on
the ground that these properties "facilitated" the drug deal. 4
Thus, in addition to a seven-year prison term, the federal government deprived Austin of virtually all of his assets.
During the October 1992 term, the Supreme Court heard
Austin's case. The Court determined that the seizure of his
home and his legitimate business enterprise constituted punishment for a crime and therefore should be subject to the constraints of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "excessive
fines."5 This case and four others the Court heard during the
same term limit the reach of federal drug asset forfeitures. 6 The
Austin case in particular indicates the Court's apparent view
that the cumulative effect of criminal and civil punishments on
drug offenders deserves reassessment.
The present movement to reform drug sentencing focuses
exclusively on criminal sentencing provisions. Some federal district court judges and other observers have loudly protested the
harshness of the mandatory prison sentences that drug offenders receive. 7 For its part, the Justice Department has demon4. Id. Federal asset forfeiture laws permit the government to seize
properties that "facilitate" a drug law violation. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988);
see also infranotes 40-49 and accompanying text (addressing punitive nature of
various provisions of § 881).
5. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2812.
6. The Supreme Court ruled against the government in four of the five
forfeiture cases decided this term. United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 495 (1993) (holding that "[absent exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to afford notice and
an opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture"); Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993) (holding that
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil forfeiture penalties); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S.Ct. 1126, 1131-34 (1993)
(concluding that owner's ignorance of the source of the funds she used to
purchase real property is a defense to a civil forfeiture proceeding against that
property); Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 554, 562 (1992)
(holding that government cannot deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction by
transferring proceeds from forfeited property out of judicial district). The fifth
case, Alexander v. United States, is a criminal forfeiture case in which the Court
remanded for further proceedings consistent with its decision in Austin. 113 S.
Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993).
7. Of course, many judges resent their loss of discretion in sentencing.
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 924-25 (1991) (discussing how some
judges defy the guidelines); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of
Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on the Discretionof Sentencers, 101 YAIE L.J.
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strated a new willingness to reconsider federal drug policies.8
Yet the dialogue of sentencing reform omits any consideration of
the use of civil asset forfeitures as a means of punishing drug
offenders. A complete assessment of drug sentencing must take
into account the full extent of drug offense punishment by including both traditional criminal sentences and the civil forfeiture of assets such as homes and businesses.
The civil forfeiture process, upon which federal prosecutors
heavily rely, offers numerous procedural and financial benefits
to law enforcement over criminal sentencing. 9 In fact, the gov1681, 1685 (1992) (noting that the "guidelines have provoked dismay and evasion in the federal courts and the bar"). Many judges complain specifically
about the harshness of sentences under the guidelines and, in particular, the
harshness of drug sentences. See U.S. District Senior Judge Whitman Knapp,
The War on Drugs, Address Before the Merchants Club in New York City (Mar.
24, 1993), in 5 FED. SENTENCING REP., MarJApr. 1993, at 294-97 (discussing the
futility of the drug war and its "terrible judicial result" on sentencing); Memorandum from Jack B. Weinstein, U.S. District Senior Judge for the Eastern District of New York, to the Judges and Magistrates of the Eastern District of New
York (Apr. 12, 1993), in 5 FED. SENTENCiNG REP., Mar./Apr. 1993, at 298 (removing himself, as has Judge Knapp, from sentencing in drug cases); see also
Sentencing Commission'sSymposium on Drugsand Violence Puts Emphasis on
Prevention,53 Camn. L. REP. (BNA) No. 12, at 1265 (June 23, 1993) (summarizing discussions by symposium speakers criticizing federal mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenses); Cris Carmody, Revolt to Sentencing Is GainingMomentum, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1993, at 10 (reporting that Judges Knapp and
Weinstein refuse to take drug cases because they believe the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are too harsh); David Margolick, Full Spectrum of JudicialCritics Assail Prison Sentencing Guides; 5-Year Effort Is Called Hobgoblin of U.S.
Courts, N.Y. Tnils, Apr. 12, 1992, at Al (discussing widespread judicial criticism of the guidelines); Jonathan M. Moses, Many Judges Skirt Sentencing
Guidelines, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1993, at B-12 (reporting some judges' reluctance to apply stiff sentences that the guidelines require in drug cases);
Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission's Drug Guidelines: CourierCases
Where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP., SeptlOct.
1990, at 63 (noting several federal judges who have publicly complained about
the harshness of the guidelines and one who resigned in protest).
8. The change in attitude may simply reflect the changing of the guard
that occurred when the new administration appointed a new Attorney General,
Janet Reno. She announced as one of her first policy statements that she will
reconsider the way in which minor drug offenders are sentenced in federal
court. Stephen Labaton, Reno Moving to Reverse Stiff SentencingRule for Minor Drug Crimes, N.Y. TinEs, May 5, 1993, at A19; see also Joseph B. Treaster,
Clinton Altering Nation's Tactics in Drug Battle, N.Y. TmEs, Oct. 21, 1993, at
Al (reporting that President Clinton planned to focus national drug strategy on
treatment for hard-core drug users and social programs rather than on interdiction of drugs).
9. See William P. Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered? GainingCompliance with Search and Seizure Standardsin the
Age of Asset Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1313-32 (1992) (concluding the
civil forfeiture process not only provides monetary incentives for law enforce-
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ernment's advantages so overwhelm property owners that commentators have long criticized the perceived constitutional and
policy shortcomings of civil forfeiture. 10 Drug offenders, howment but also enables the government to take advantage of a lower evidentiary
standard and broad civil discovery rules); Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture,Burdens of ProofAnd the War on Drugs, 83 J. CRaM. L. & CRmNOLOGY 274, 279-86
(1992) (outlining briefly the procedural steps for affecting a forfeiture).
The Justice Department strongly advocates the use of the civil asset forfeiture process and encourages states to develop similar statutes for reasons of
expediency. See 1991 ANN. REP. OF THE DEPT OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFErrURE
PROGRAM 12 (hereinafter 1991 ANN. REP.) ("[States] should allow the use of civil
proceedings, so that prosecutors need not wait for the conclusion of an often
lengthy criminal trial before forfeiting assets obviously derived from or connected with the drug trade."); see also part 1.C (addressing the government's
advantages and interests in civil forfeiture of drug assets).
10. For a discussion of civil forfeiture, see generally Michael Goldsmith &
Mark J. Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for
FurtherLaw Reform, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1254 (1989) (proposing legislative reform
of forfeiture laws to better protect the rights of third parties); Craig W. Palm,
RICO Forfeitureand the Eighth Amendment: When Is Everything Too Much?,
53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1991) (arguing that amending RICO to give the courts
discretion in forfeiture cases would avoid Eighth Amendment concerns); Stahl,
supra note 9 (arguing that forfeiture constitutes criminal punishment and that
the government must therefore prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt); Alok
Ahuja, Civil Forfeiture, WarrantlessPropertySeizures, and the FourthAmendment, 5 YAE L. & PoL'Y REv. 428 (1987) (advocating strict application of Fourth
Amendment standards in the context of civil forfeiture); Mark A. Jankowski,
Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to
Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165 (1990) (advocating a narrower construction of the relation-back doctrine and an amendment to the innocent-ownership defense to promote consistent and fair application of forfeiture
laws); Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real PropertyForfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 471 (1989) (encouraging consistent treatment by suggesting a broad interpretation of the innocent owner defense); Nelson, supra note 9 (suggesting a
rule that would prohibit the forfeiture of assets taken in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Tamara R. Piety, Comment, ScorchedEarth: How the Expansion
of Civil ForfeitureDoctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 UNiv. MiLmi L.
REV. 911 (1991) (endorsing the proposition that "draconian" civil forfeiture
laws violate defendants' due process rights); Damon G. Saltzburg, Note, Real
PropertyForfeituresas a Weapon in the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure
to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L. REv. 217 (1992) (discussing
need for a forfeiture proposal that would balance the interests of the both the
government and the innocent owners of forfeited property); Michael Schecter,
Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1151
(1990) (arguing that drug forfeiture statutes are criminal and proposing reform
that provides adequate due process and reduces harsh results); Sean D. Smith,
Comment, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related Crimes
Under the ComprehensiveForfeitureAct, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 303 (1988) (defending expansive interpretation of federal forfeiture provisions against Eighth
Amendment challenges); James B. Speta, Note, Narrowing the Scope of Civil
Drug Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MicH. L. REv. 165 (1990) (finding constitutional need to narrow the
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ever, also face stiff criminal penalties. In effect, Congress has
created parallel systems for the disposition of drug cases: one
civil and one criminal. The civil forfeiture process serves as an
adjunct or as an alternative to the criminal justice system. In
some cases, the government may pursue both civil forfeiture and
criminal prosecution. By pursuing both civil and criminal actions, the government may inflict punishment on drug offenders
twice because criminal courts do not factor into the sentencing
calculus the loss suffered from the forfeiture action. 1
Changes in the operation of the civil forfeiture process, such
as those required by Austin, may make that process, standing
alone, more fair because courts will measure the value of forfeited properties against the severity of the offense. Such
changes, however, will not promote rational, fair treatment of
drug offenders overall. The relationship between the dual criminal and civil sources of punishment for drug offenders has
evaded scrutiny because, until Austin, courts did not consider
civil forfeitures as punishment, but merely as remedial measures. By structuring the forfeiture process as a civil action, Congress created a system that courts treat as distinct and
ostensibly unrelated to the criminal sentencing system.
This Article urges Congress and courts to reconsider and
reconcile the dual measures employed against drug offenders.
Civil forfeiture practice may be a legitimate and necessary response in some cases, such as when the drug offender is outside
the jurisdictional reach of the government, which was the original purpose of civil asset forfeiture,1 2 or to recover contraband,
instrumentalities, or ill-gotten gains. When the government
reaches beyond this limited set of cases, however, it moves into
the realm of punishment for crime. As such, Congress and
courts should factor this punishment into the sentencing decision to promote rational and proportional sentencing. i3
scope of drug forfeiture); Jack Yoskowitz, The War on the Poor: Civil Forfeiture
of Public Housing,25 COLmi. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 567 (1992) (arguing that the
in rem nature of civil forfeiture is a legal fiction that should be abolished).
11. For a discussion of the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy implications
of punitive forfeitures followed by criminal sentences, see infra notes 182-196
and accompanying text.
12. Originally, the civil asset forfeiture process developed in admiralty law
was intended to exact punishment on, and recover restitution for victims from,
foreign owners of ships who could not be brought into court. See infra notes
169-174 and accompanying text (discussing early forfeiture statutes).
13. For a discussion of proportionality as a goal at sentencing, see infra
part H.B.
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Ideally, Congress should abolish the practice of imposing
punitive forfeitures in civil forfeiture actions. Alternatively, the
United States Sentencing Commission could amend the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provisions on fines and forfeitures to require judges to factor the consequences of civil forfeiture actions
into their sentencing decisions. Finally, even without action by
Congress or the Commission, individual sentencing judges could
exercise their authority to depart downward from Guidelines
sentences on account of punitive civil forfeitures, and they could
utilize criminal forfeitures as a means of tempering prison
sentences.
By acknowledging that punitive forfeitures are part of criminal sentences, criminal courts would accomplish two important
goals. They would be able to better tailor the criminal sentences
to fit the crimes. A sentencing judge probably would not find
that a small-time dealer like Austin deserves to be deprived of
all his assets. Criminal courts also would be able to reduce their
reliance on imprisonment as a primary form of punishment. Instead, courts could impose financial penalties and punitive forfeitures in combination with shorter prison sentences. As drug
offenses are the most vigorously prosecuted offenses, these
changes would have a significant impact on the administration
14
of criminal justice in federal courts.
Part II of this Article examines the parallel systems for punishing drug offenders by criminal sentencing as well as the civil
forfeiture process. This section describes the civil forfeiture process and examines its advantages to prosecution and law enforcement. Part III of this Article highlights two significant
recent decisions that signal a change in the Court's previously
supportive view of civil forfeiture: Austin v. UnitedStates' 5 and
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave. 16 These cases focus on two
fundamental penological limiting principles: the mental element of a criminal act and proportionality in sentencing.
Neither principle previously has played a part in the civil forfei14. A number of measures reflect the high priority the federal government
has placed on the prosecution of drug offenses since 1980. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that between 1980 and 1990, the number of drug offenders convicted in federal courts more than tripled, while the number of non-drug
convictions rose by only 32%. Douglas C. McDonald et al., FederalSentencing
in Transition, 1986-90, BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REP. 4 (1992).
Of the 37,725 offenders receiving prison sentences in federal courts in 1992,
15,544 were convicted of drug trafficking. 1992 U.S. SENTENCING COMe'N ANN.

REP. app. B.
15.
16.

113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
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ture process. The judicial pronouncements will work some basic
changes in the civil forfeiture process that will reshape it to better conform to the criminal process paradigm. Yet these adjustments are insufficient if the goal is to rationalize drug offense
sentencing. Even if the civil process can protect drug offenders
from excessive or arbitrary punishment, imposition of punishment through the combination of civil and criminal actions can
produce a package of punishments that may far exceed that
which is justified by the severity of the infraction.
In Part IV, this Article suggests some statutory reforms
that would consolidate the punishment of drug offenders into a
single, comprehensive criminal sentencing proceeding. Purely
remedial forfeitures could continue to be brought in civil actions,
but punitive forfeitures would best be sought after conviction in
a criminal proceeding. This section attempts to balance the interests of law enforcement in obtaining asset forfeitures against
the sentencing concerns that current civil forfeiture practices
raise. This Article concludes that some aspects of the civil system can be transferred to the criminal system without jeopardizing law enforcement's ability to investigate and disable complex
drug operations. Overall, the legitimate and pressing needs of
law enforcement and the goals of fair sentencing can both be
satisfied.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE AS
A PARALLEL SYSTEM OF PUNISHMENT
Traditionally, the State has brought its power to bear
against individuals who violate the penal laws of the jurisdiction.17 Upon conviction, courts sentence individuals to a punishment-involving a deprivation of life, liberty, or propertyconsistent with various factors that courts have long considered
relevant to the sentencing decision.' 8 In most cases, this process
17. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSMLTY (1968)
(discussing the philosophy of penal law); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LnvITS OF
THE CRmINAL SANCTIoN (1968) (describing the rationale, procedure, and limitations of criminal law); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 L.
& CONTEmnw. PROBS. 401 (1958) (pointing out the complexities and competing
principles within criminal law).
18. Under the traditional indeterminate sentencing system that federal
judges used until the late 1980s, courts had broad discretion in deciding
whether certain factors were relevant to the sentencing decision and how much
weight to accord them. Most courts agreed that the severity of the offense was
extremely significant. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)
(noting that indeterminate sentencing requires courts to look at "the fullest information possible concerning the defendants life and characteristics"). Of-
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works well in the sense that it permits society to pursue the
goals of the criminal justice system by publicly sanctioning the
individuals responsible for the violations.
In other cases, this process does not work well, namely, in
those cases in which law enforcement cannot bring individuals
to justice because it cannot bring them into the jurisdiction.
Originally, the creation of civil in rem forfeitures gave the government a tool to punish individuals over whom courts could not
obtain in personam jurisdiction, but whose property was found
within the jurisdiction. 19 In the earliest forfeiture cases involving admiralty issues, courts determined that the arrest and punishment of the individuals on the vessel would be ineffectual as
a deterrent to smuggling because the vessel, if returned to its
foreign owners, would simply make its way back into the country with a new crew. 20 The need to confiscate the contraband as
well as the offending vessel was manifest if the government intended to sanction the foreign owners.
Over the years, Congress expanded the scope of civil in rem
forfeitures beyond that which is justified by its original purpose.
fense severity, however, varied according to the circumstances. A man who
intentionally killed his wife to collect life insurance and marry another woman
would be considered the worst type of killer. On the other hand, a man who
intentionally killed his wife because she had a terminal illness and was suffering greatly would be treated with compassion by most judges. Courts also considered offender characteristics such as family background, employment, age,
and education. These characteristics were generally considered relevant to an
offender's potential to be rehabilitated. See id. at 247-50.
For an insightful analysis of federal district court decision-making in a
study of white collar criminal cases prior to the enactment of determinate sentencing via the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see STANTON WHEELER ET AL.,
SITrING IN JUDGmENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988).
For a discussion of post-guidelines sentencing factors, see Barbara S. Meierhoffer, The Role of Offense and Offender Characteristicsin Federal Sentencing, 66
S. CAL. L. REv. 367 (1992) (evaluating the results of a study of drug offenders
sentenced from January 1984 through 1990).
19. If jurisdiction is based on the court's power over property within its
territory, the action is called "in rem" or "quasi in rem." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 199 (1977). The state in which the property is located has exclusive
sovereignty over that property. Id. at 200. In rem actions will proceed regardless of the owner's location. Id. at 199-200. In in rem actions, courts follow the
guidelines of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Under
this standard, courts must evaluate all assertions of state jurisdiction according
to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" and the complainant
must have at least "minimum contacts" with the forum state. Id. at 316-19; see
also infra part IV.A.2 (discussing lack of in personam jurisdiction).
20. The Department of Justice uses this example in its discussion of the
need for asset forfeitures. 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 7. The report, however, does not offer a theoretical justification for civil forfeitures in cases in
which the government can bring individuals into custody.
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Congress has adapted this expanded form of civil in rem forfeiture to fight the drug industry by permitting forfeiture for any
felony violation of federal drug laws. 2 1 In effect, Congress has
chosen to resort to a parallel system for punishing drug offenders: criminal sentencing of the individual and a civil forfeiture
process by which a person can be dispossessed of any property
22
involved in the drug offense.
In retrospect, one can understand why asset forfeitures became a central focus of law enforcement activities in the drug
war. Students of drug crimes have long recognized that, unlike
most criminals, drug offenders are part of a profit-making "industry."2 3 The lifeblood of the industry is the money that it generates. How better, then, to deal with drug offenders than to
deprive them, and their associates, of the fruits of their labor. It
was only a matter of time before Congress sought to attack the
24
economic base of the drug industry.
21. The growth of federal drug laws has expanded the reach of the forfeiture laws. With the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress dramatically increased the scope of activity that federal criminal law covers. Pub. L. No. 100690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). Much of the activity encompassed by the 1988 statute had previously been addressed at the state level and has no obvious federal
interest. The provision making it a federal crime to possess even a small
amount of a controlled substance provides a stark example. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)
(1988); see also Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme
Court'sApproach to the War on Drugs, 19 AM. J. Cmi. L. 219, 257 (1992) (providing examples of harsh drug penalties). Federal drug law now also doubles
and triples the penalities for drug offenders if their crimes involve youths or
pregnant women. 21 U.S.C. § 845b(d), Cf) (1988). The statute reaches the distribution of a controlled substance to persons under 21 years of age, 21 U.S.C.
§ 845 (1988), and the distribution or manufacture of a controlled substance
within one thousand feet of any school-public or private, grade school through
university level-or within one hundred feet of any playground, public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility. 21 U.S.C.
§ 845a(a) (1988).
22. Although a criminal forfeiture process also exists, 21 U.S.C. § 853
(1988), the government uses it less. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying
text (discussing the governments preference of civil over criminal forfeiture).
23. See, e.g., Gerald T. McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation
of a DangerousDrug, 58 CoRNEmLL L. REv. 537, 547-549 (1973) (addressing the
distribution and sale of heroin and cocaine arriving from sources abroad into
the United States); James E. Gierach, An Economic Attack on illicit Drugs,
A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 95 (encouraging an economic and medically based national drug policy).
24. At the same time that Congress enacted provisions to deprive drug
traders of their profits, the legislature also enacted a similar provision to attack
the economic base of organized crime, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(the progenitor to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") statute). Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
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Having determined that financial penalties, even more than
deprivations of liberty, would work most effectively to deter the
drug trade, Congress could have proceeded in at least three
ways: it might have opted to stiffen the fine provisions of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines applicable to drug offenses; it
might have created a sweeping criminal forfeiture process; or it
might have adopted a process separate and apart from the criminal process altogether, such as the in rem civil forfeiture action.
Either of the first two options-fines or criminal forfeiturecould be imposed only after a criminal conviction as part of the
sentence for the crime. Apparently, these options were less attractive than the civil forfeiture action, which requires neither a
criminal conviction nor, until recently, financial deprivation lim25
ited by an assessment of the severity of the offense.
At the time of sentencing for a criminal offense, courts need
not take into account the value of the assets the government has
seized or plans to seize through forfeiture. Sentencing may proceed as though this fact were irrelevant to the sentencing determination. The sentencing court may decide, by means of strict
sentencing guidelines, 2 6 what punishment is proportional to the
seriousness of the offense, without decreasing the criminal punishment by the amount of punishment the defendant will face in
the forfeiture action. Although many have criticized the legal
fiction that in rem civil forfeiture cases use to treat property as
the guilty party, an even more significant legal fiction is that
which allows courts to ignore the fact of forfeiture as if it was not
one of the punitive measures taken against the individual. Assuming arguendo that some civil forfeitures constitute punishment, a criminal sentence imposed without regard to the
Over time, however, the motivation behind forfeitures shifted from attacking the most powerful drug dealers to amassing the greatest revenues for law
enforcement coffers, no matter how insignificant the alleged drug deal. For a
thorough discussion of law enforcement goals in pursuing asset forfeitures, see
Nelson, supra note 9 at 1324-1333; see also infra notes 73-83 and accompanying
text.
25. See infra part III.B (discussing the Austin decision's proportionality
requirement).
26. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, adopted in 1987, place limits on
federal courts' discretion in sentencing. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUInELINES MAUAL (1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.I. The adoption of
the Guidelines has radically changed federal sentencing practice from the indeterminate sentencing model that preceded it. See generally Stephen Breyer,
The FederalSentencingGuidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988) (providing historical analysis of the guidelines and the changes in sentencing they have created).
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punishment inflicted through civil forfeiture is a fortiori excessive and disproportionate to the offense.
It is to this set of cases-those in which the government
prosecutes an individual in criminal court for the same conduct
that resulted in forfeiture-that reformers should focus their attention. To promote the Federal Sentencing Guideline's goals of
proportionality and fairness, the extent of punishment inflicted
through forfeiture should mitigate the criminal sentence.2 7 This
country has never considered any crime so outrageous as to obviate the need for limits on the severity of punishment in proportion to the severity of the crime.

A.

HISTORY OF CML ASSET FoRFEITUREs AS PUNISHMENT

In general, law enforcement authorities have long pursued
civil asset forfeitures for many types of offenses because of the
advantages the process offers. Civil forfeiture actions give the
government the authority to seize and dispose of property involved in a criminal offense and retain the proceeds from the
sale of the asset for government use. 28 Civil forfeiture actions

proceed against properties, based on the fiction that the assets
27. Indeed, forfeiture actions themselves were not designed to mete out
criminal sentences. Until Austin, the forfeiture process did not include a proportionality requirement. The Austin decision now requires courts to weigh the
value of assets forfeited against the seriousness of the criminal offense alleged,
as they would in a sentencing proceeding, but Austin does nothing to remedy
the double punishment problem when the government both forfeits property
and exacts a sentence in criminal court as well. See infra part III.B (analyzing
the Austin decision).
28. Federal law provides for the forfeiture of assets resulting from a variety
of other crimes besides drug offenses. See, e.g., 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at
29 (noting the Immigration and Naturalization Service forfeits vehicles seized
at the border due to immigration law violations). The thrust ofthe federal asset
forfeiture programs, however, is aimed at drug offenders and racketeering activity. Commonly used forfeiture statutes include the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 803, 84 Stat. 922, 937 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955 (1988)) (civil forfeiture for gambling violations); the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 943 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (criminal forfeiture for
RICO violations); the Money and Finance Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 5317, 96
Stat. 877, 998 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992))
(civil forfeiture for money laundering violations); and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-35 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (civil forfeiture for money laundering violations and felony drug violations against foreign nations); see also 1991 ANN.
REP., supra note 9, at 107 app I. For a thorough discussion of the range of
government imposed punitive civil sanctions, see Kenneth Mann, PunitiveCivil
Sanctions: The MiddlegroundBetween Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J.
1795 (1992).
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in question are themselves "guilty,"2 9 and as if the owners had
no interest in their disposition. Actions are thus styled as
"United States v. A Certain Piece of Property," not as "United
States v. An Individual." Deeming inanimate property to be a
party to a lawsuit allows the government to avoid providing
property owners with many of the protections the Constitution
affords to individuals charged with crimes.3 0
Of course, contraband, drug proceeds, and genuine "instrumentalities" such as weapons or drug equipment, should be
civilly forfeitable. The civil forfeiture process gives the government the means to expeditiously dispossess suspected criminals
of illegal, illegally-used, or illegally-obtained items. Courts,
however, have a long history of imposing civil forfeiture even in
cases in which the property cannot be characterized as contraband, instrumentality, or criminal proceeds. In such cases, the
government stands on shaky ground if the argument for an expeditious process is one of necessity. When the government goes
beyond dispossessing criminals of illegal or dangerous substances or criminal proceeds, it moves into the realm of punishment of crime.
29. The rule was first enunciated in United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). The Court stated that, "[t]he vessel which commits
the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to
which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner." Id. at 233. This legal fiction persists in civil forfeiture law to date. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
680-684 (1974); see also 1991 ANN. REP., supranote 9, at 7-8; Terrance G. Reed,
American ForfeitureLaw: Property Owners Meet the Prosecutor,Poiy ANALYsis (CATO Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 29, 1992, at 3, 6-7 (discussing the
fiction of proceeding against property).
30. See generally Stahl, supra note 9 (arguing that the government's burden of proof violates the Due Process Clause); Ahuja, supra note 10, (discussing
the inadequate protection that courts afford to Fourth Amendment rights); Nelson, supra note 9 (same); Schecter, supra note 10 (concluding that civil forfeitures violate the Due Process Clause); Yoskowitz, supra note 10 (asserting that
civil forfeitures violate the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment).
The Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings. Even
in criminal forfeitures, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not bar forfeiture of assets that would be used to pay bona
fide attorney's fees. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); see also Morgan Cloud, Government IntrusionsInto the Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Impact of Fee Forfeitures on the Balance of Power in the Adversary System of
CriminalJustice, 36 EMORY L. J. 817 (1987) (discussing the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel in the context of fee forfeitures); Morgan Cloud, ForfeitingDefense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an InstitutionalRole Theory to Define Individual ConstitutionalRights, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1 (1987) (same).
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The constitutionality of using a civil process to punish for
crimes is considered well settled, although upon closer scrutiny
the historical basis for punitive forfeitures seems less obvious.
An important early forfeiture case, Miller v. United States,,3
that the Court later ignored, squarely addressed the constitutionality of civil forfeiture to punish crimes against the sovereign. In this case, the government initiated an action to forfeit
property of a Northern rebel during the Civil War. The nature
of the disagreement between the majority and the dissenting
Justices lay not in whether the Constitution permits forfeitures
to be used to punish for crimes but rather in the source of Congress's authority to permit forfeiture for treason. The majority
contended that Congress had exercised its war powers in enacting the forfeiture statute at issue. 32 Justice Field's dissenting
opinion urged that the statute did no more than to punish the
crime of treason, an exercise of Congress's municipal (or police)
power.3 3
Both the majority and the dissenters agreed on the more
important issue for present purposes, that is, whether a civil forfeiture process that merely serves as an alternative form of
criminal prosecution violates the Constitution.3 4 Justice Strong
wrote for the majority:
The [plaintiffs] objection starts with the assumption that the purpose
of the acts was to punish offences against the sovereignty of the United
States, and that they are merely statutes against crimes. If this were a
correct assumption, if the act of 1861, and the fifth, sixth, and seventh
sections of the act of July 17, 1862, were municipal regulations only,
there would be force in the objection that Congress has disregarded the
35
restrictions of the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution.

In light of this passage, one might have expected the Court
to reject, or at least carefully analyze, forfeiture laws applied for
the sole purpose of punishing a crime. Instead, in Dobbins'sDistillery v. United States, 36 the Court subsequently upheld the
constitutionality of a forfeiture law against a claim that the
action was of a criminal nature and thus could not be executed
except upon conviction. In a formalistic analysis, the Court
found the proceeding to be of a civil nature in that it "d[idl not
involve the personal conviction of the wrong-doer for the offense
charged... [and] the conviction of the wrong-doer [had to] be ob31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871).
Id. at 305.
Id. at 314-321 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 304.
Id.
96 U.S. 395 (1877).
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tained, if at all, in another and wholly independent
37
proceeding."
Since Dobbin's Distillery, the Supreme Court has not seriously questioned the constitutionality of civil forfeiture statutes
that aim to punish for criminal wrongdoing. In a number of decisions the Court wavered, recognizing the criminal nature of
forfeiture actions and applying certain constitutional provisions
to them.38 In most cases, however, the Court has maintained
the fiction that the action is civil and proceeds against "guilty"
property.3 9
B.

SECTION 881 FoR.FEITUEs As PuNIsHMENT

When Congress enacted the civil drug asset forfeiture law,
21 U.S.C. § 881, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,40 the law made assets of both a

remedial and punitive nature civilly forfeitable. Section 881 allowed the forfeiture of contraband, containers, and conveyances
used to transport the contraband. 4 1 Contraband forfeitures are
clearly remedial in that they "remove[ ] dangerous or illegal
items from society."42 The government should not need to obtain a criminal conviction to confiscate contraband because a
37. Id. at 399; see also Goldsmith-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511
(1921) ("[W]hether the reason for [civil forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to now be
displaced.").
38. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (declaring that forfeitures for criminal offenses are of a "quasi-criminal nature," and the Fourth
Amendment and Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination should
apply); United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556
(1983) (Fifth Amendment speedy trial guarantee); United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 722 (1971) (Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 701 (1965) (Fourth Amendment); see also Stahl, supra note 9, at 294301 (discussing the historical distinction between civil and criminal forfeitures);
Schecter, supra note 10, at 1159 (discussing the Court's inconsistency in recognizing the criminal nature of forfeiture actions).
39. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
684-85 (1974) (citing cases involving "guilty" property); Goldsmith-Grant v.
United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921) ("Congress... ascrib[es] to the property
a certain personality .... ").
40. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); see also Nelson, supra note 9, at 131417 (discussing the development of civil forfeiture statute § 881).
41. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a).
42. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2811 (1993) (citing United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984)).
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drug dealer should not be allowed to retain it under any
circumstances.
The same is true for the forfeiture of proceeds of drug activity made forfeitable under § 881(a)(6).43 The forfeiture of money
or assets traceable to drug transactions should not be considered
punishment because the drug offender was never entitled to
them in the first place. Forfeiture of drug proceeds merely puts
criminals in the same place they would have been had they not
committed the crime. If the government can establish that drug
proceeds are illegitimately acquired, the person possessing them
has no standing to complain of unfair punishment if the funds
are forfeited; their removal is not punishment. 44
If forfeiture was limited to seizing the instrumentalities or
"ill-gotten gains" of notorious drug dealers, the theoretical juxtaposition of civil process and the criminal justice system would
attract little criticism. The law, however, places no such restriction on law enforcement. Given the long historical practice of
seizing conveyances, 45 it is not surprising that such a provision
appeared in the earliest version of § 881. As the Court affirmed
in Austin, the forfeiture of conveyances that transport contraband, such as cars, trucks, and yachts, is punitive, not
46
remedial.
43. In 1978 Congress extended the reach of the law by authorizing the forfeiture of "[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished.., in exchange for a controlled substance... or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation...." Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)
(1988)).
Approving the use of a civil process for the forfeiture of these proceeds does
not preclude an assessment of the process used. In particular, many authors
have criticized the burdens of proof and other constitutional issues relating to
the civil forfeiture process. For a sampling of these criticisms, see supra notes
9-10.
44. This provision would not allow forfeiture of drug proceeds that an innocent merchant possessed, such as one who sold something to a drug dealer without knowing the source of the buyer's money. In that situation, the government
could seize the thing that the drug dealer had purchased, but not the money
that he had given to the innocent seller. Indeed, even if the innocent person
had received the money as a gift, the money is not forfeitable if the person did
not have knowledge of its source. See infra part HI-A (discussing the innocent
owner defense).
45. From its inception in admiralty, forfeitures have reached instruments
of conveyance such as ships, and at a later point in history, automobiles and
airplanes. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text (discussing the
seizure of conveyances used to transport contraband).
46. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965)) (reasoning that because "instruments" of
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In 1984 Congress greatly increased the possibilities for punishment by making forfeitable "[a]ll real property . . . in the
whole of any lot or tract of land... which is used, or intended to
be used.., to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a [controlled substance] violation... ."47 A broad reading of this provision has enabled law enforcement to take property based on
even the most tenuous connection to a drug transaction, such as
property that serves as the location of a drug deal. Prior to the
Austin decision, the government often took large tracts of land,
buildings including homes, and legitimate business enterprises,
on the ground that a drug transaction took place on the property. 48 The value of the property seized bore no relation to the
level of culpability.
In response to numerous reports of abuse, 4 9 Congress enacted a recent amendment that provides a defense to property
owners who do not know their property was used to facilitate a
drug offense. 50 Remarkably, this is a novel defense not traditionally provided. Further changes are in order, but efforts at
reform would be deficient if reformers do not carefully examine
the interests of prosecutors and law enforcement agencies in
pursuing civil forfeitures as a weapon in fighting drug crime.

drug trade are not necessarily themselves contraband, their forfeiture must be
punitive).
47. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 306, 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)).
As the statute clearly states, the value of the property is not considered in relation to the seriousness of the particular violation committed, rather all of the
property is subject to forfeiture for any violation. Id.
Property found in other countries may also be subject to civil forfeiture if
the foreign country is willing to transfer the property to the United States. This
practice is rapidly growing. See 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 43-47.
48. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 1314-17; Stahl, supra note 9, at 278.
49. Many articles and editorials have criticized the abuses of the forfeiture
program. See, e.g., Cris Carmody et al., Congress Hears Charges of Forfeiture
Abuse, NATVL L.J., Oct. 12, 1992, at 5 (reporting alleged abuses in the Justice
Department's Asset Forfeiture Program); Stephen Labaton, Seized Propertyin
Crime Cases Causes Concern, N.Y. Tnrms, May 31, 1993, at Al ("[t]he seizing of
suspects' property ... is out of control"); Terrance G. Reed, Forfeiture Run
Amok: Some Officials Are Using Legal Tactic as a Tool of Social Engineering,
L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 17, 1992, at 6 ("[F]orfeiture law has quickly become the
darling of law enforcement ...."); Drug Bust: Federal Asset-Forfeiture Law
Abused, Needs Reform, Hous. PosT, Sept. 7, 1992, at A32 (arguing that federal
forfeiture law needs reform).
50. See infra part llI.A (discussing the innocent owner defense).
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THE GovERNiENs ADVANTAGES AND INTERESTS

The government enjoys a number of advantages in civil asset forfeiture that make it more attractive to prosecutors than
its rarely-used criminal forfeiture counterpart. 5 ' Of utmost significance is the fact that, unlike criminal forfeiture, 5 2 civil forfeiture does not require a criminal conviction. 53 This difference is
important because in some cases illegitimate properties could
51. A criminal forfeiture process is authorized at 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988):
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter H of this chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision
of State law(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any other person's property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall
forfeit, in addition to any property described in paragraph (1) or (2),
any of his interest in, claims against, and property or contractual
rights affording a source of control over, the continuing criminal enterprise. The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in
addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to this subchapter or
subchapter II of this chapter, that the person forfeit to the United
States all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this part, a defendant who derives profits or other
proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross
profits or other proceeds.

Id.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not add anything to the criminal forfeiture provisions of § 853. The criminal forfeiture section of the guidelines
merely states that forfeiture of a defendant's property may occur "as provided
by statute." U.S.S.G., supra note 26, at § 5E1.4. An additional criminal drug
forfeiture provision, under § 848, provides for the forfeiture of the property of
one who engages in a "continuing criminal enterprise" (CCE). One engages in a
continuing criminal enterprise if he leads five or more other persons in committing a continuing series of federal drug felonies which produce substantial income. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988).
52. Criminal forfeiture may only occur after conviction and only upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988).
53. One of the earliest forfeiture cases, The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1
(1827), makes clear that since the earliest days, civil in rem forfeiture actions
have not depended on criminal proceedings in personam. Justice Story wrote
for the court: "[T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand [sic] the
law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam." Id. at 15 (italics in original).
Even at this early date, forfeiture was often used in lieu of or in addition to
criminal prosecution: "Many cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done attaches solely in rem, and there is no accompanying penalty inpersonam. Many
cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal penalty." Id.
at 14-15 (italics in original).
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not be forfeited if a conviction were required. 54 In addition, the
government must show only probable cause, not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as criminal forfeiture requires, that the property is subject to forfeiture because of its illegal nature or its use
in an unlawful manner. 55 Once the government establishes
probable cause in a civil forfeiture, the burden shifts to the person claiming an ownership interest in the property to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the property was not used or
intended to be used to commit or facilitate a drug violation. 56
Until recently, § 881 also offered the advantage to the government of permitting the seizure of property before holding a
hearing on the propriety of the forfeiture and without giving notice to the owner. 5 7 The law still permits pre-conviction seizure,
however, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property held that the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require preseizure notice and an adversary hearing to precede forfeiture of
all real property. 58 The Court did not limit its ruling to residential properties, 5 9 as had some lower courts. 60 In contrast, the
exceptions for pre-conviction seizure of property under criminal
forfeiture law are narrow. 6 ' Thus, the civil forfeiture process
54. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
55. For a thorough discussion of burden of proof issues in civil drug asset
forfeitures, see Stahl, supra note 9, at 284-85, 291-94.
56. See United States v. Parcels of Real Property with Building, 913 F.2d 1
(lst Cir. 1990); see also Stahl, supranote 9, at 284-85 (discussing the burdens of
proof under § 881).
57. For a discussion of the seizure procedures of § 881, see Stahl, supra
note 9, at 279-81. Stahl's article, however, predates the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492
(1993), and the procedures will have to be modified in light of the Court's decision. See infra notes 58-59.
58. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 505.
59. Id.
60. See Stahl, supra note 9, at 281 n.34 (citing cases).
61. The procedures for seizure of forfeitable assets under § 853 are more
cumbersome for prosecutors and give defendants an opportunity to transfer or
hide assets prior to sentencing. Unlike the civil forfeiture process, assets may
not be seized prior to the issuance of a judicial forfeiture order. A restraining
order or injunction may be obtained by the government to preserve the property
for forfeiture. This may occur, however, only upon the filing of an indictment or
information, or prior to such a filing if the government meets the high burden of
demonstrating the necessity of the seizure. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1988). A restraining order or injunction may be ordered if a court finds the following:
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will
prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will
result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of
the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and
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closes the window of opportunity for an accused drug dealer to
hide or transfer valuable assets during the time after indictment
but prior to conviction, while
the criminal forfeiture provision
62
offers few such advantages.
An added benefit existed for prosecutors until the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Republic National Bank v. United
States.63 In light of the in rem nature of civil forfeiture jurisdiction, some lower courts held that the government could divest
them of jurisdiction to hear appeals from forfeiture decisions by
selling or transferring the res, or asset. 64 Justice Blackmun,
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through
the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party
against whom the order is to be entered.
21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988).
The property owner must receive notice and the opportunity for a hearing
prior to seizure. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B). Except in cases in which the government files an indictment or information, a restraining order shall only be effective for 90 days unless the government seeks an extension by showing good
cause. Id. Alternatively, a temporary restraining order may be obtained in
cases in which "provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture," but these orders are valid for only ten days. 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(e)(2). A showing of good cause may extend a temporary restraining order,
as may consent of the party against whom it is entered. Under this provision,
the court must hold a hearing at the "earliest possible time and prior to the
expiration of the temporary order." Id. In contrast, the civil forfeiture process
allows the government to seize property prior to conviction and without the necessity of obtaining a conviction. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
Thus, persons suspected of crimes do not have the time to find ways to remove
the assets from the government's reach.
62. The only advantage of criminal forfeiture is that it gives the court jurisdiction over all properties, not just those located within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction in criminal cases is predicated on the location of
the offense. See FED. R. CRMI. P. 18. Courts hearing civil forfeiture actions may
only exercise jurisdiction over assets located or brought within their territorial
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1395(b), (c). But see 21 U.S.C. § 881(j) (1988) (authorizing additional civil forfeiture venue in the district where the defendant is
found or where the criminal prosecution is brought if the defendant is the
owner of the subject property).
63. 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992).
64. In addition to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case, United States
v. 6960 Miraflores Ave., 932 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Republic
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, see United States v. Tie's Cocktail
Lounge, 873 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1989). Other Circuit Courts have rejected this
jurisdictional rule. United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1992);
United States v. $1,322,242.58, 938 F.2d 433 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v.
$29,959.00 U.S. Currency, 931 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
$95,945.18, U.S. Currency, 913 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Karen L.
Fisher, FederalCourtJurisdictionin Civil Forfeituresof PersonalPropertyPursuant to the ComprehensiveDrug Abuse Prevention and ControlAct, 26 IND. L.
REv. 657 (1993) (advocating a modern rule of jurisdiction for civil forfeiture
appeals).
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writing for the majority, abolished this jurisdictional rule in the
strongest terms: "The rule's illusory nature obviates the need
for such inquiries [into its usefulness], however, and a lack of
justification undermines any argument for its creation."6 5
The procedural advantages of civil forfeiture have enabled
the Justice Department to pursue two objectives besides punishment of drug offenders, both of which have garnered wide support from law enforcement agencies. The Justice Department
lists as secondary and tertiary concerns the encouragement of
multi-jurisdictional cooperation among law enforcement and the
creation of new revenues for law enforcement. 6 6 For purposes of
this analysis, it is not necessary to question the validity of these
objectives because the proposed changes in the forfeiture program should not affect the ability of law enforcement to pursue
67
them.
The success of the drug war, the federal government maintains, depends in large part on the ability of federal law enforcement, principally the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
to attract the cooperation of all levels of law enforcement. 68
Non-federal law enforcement agencies provide a large pool of additional personnel with street-level intelligence about drug activity, 69 a highly valuable resource to the federal effort. Thus,
since the advent of the anti-drug crusade, the federal government has endeavored to entice state and local agencies to enter
into joint operations. 70 The two main programs for interagency
cooperation in law enforcement are the DEA State and Local

65. Republic Nat'l Bank, 113 S. Ct. at 559.
66. 1991 ANN. REP. supra note 9, at 1. Professors Zirning and Hawkins
provide an insightful policy analysis of the multi-jurisdictional nature of drug
law enforcement in their recent book. FRANELIN E. ZimING & GORDON HAWKiNs, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 158-176 (1992). The authors
cite countervailing advantages and disadvantages from the heightened involvement of the federal government in drug policing. Id. at 162-64.
67. See infra Part IV.
68. 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 1.
69. See JAN CHAIKEN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES: REDUCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 48
(1990).
70. Although federal agency cooperation with state and local police has existed in some form since the mid-1960s, the interaction took on new dimensions
in the mid-1980s. Id. at 45-47. The drug control strategy transformed the federal-state-local relationship from one that is largely informal and ad hoc to one
that is formal and ongoing. Id. at 45.
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Organized Crime
Task Forces (DEA-SL Task Forces) 7 1 and the
72
Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs).
The promotion of multi-jurisdictional cooperation was effectively put into motion by the enactment of a 1984 provision that
allows the direct transfer of seized assets from drug dealers to
the law enforcement agencies that seized the assets, rather than
transferring them to the general fund of the United States
Treasury as previous forfeiture statutes required.7 3 For the first
time in our history, Congress created a profit incentive for law
71. The DEA-SL Task Forces date back to 1973 and were created on the
heels of a 1972 White House announcement of an anti-drug crusade. Id. at 44.
Asset forfeiture benefits, however, did not commence until the 1980s. Id. From
1991 to 1992, the number of DEA-SL Task Forces grew to 86 from 71, and now
exist in 40 states. OFFICE OF NATL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESiDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

118 (1992). The Admin-

istration planned to request a budget of $61.9 million for the DEA-SL Task
Forces in fiscal year 1993. Id.
72. See id. at 86. In 1982, President Reagan announced a new federal drug
control initiative, and Congress appropriated funds to create the Organized

Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program.

OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y

GEN., REPORT ON THE ORGANIZED CRamIE DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE PROGRAM 2 (1989-1990). The federal agencies involved included the Bureau of Alco-

hol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Federal
Bureau of Investigations; the Internal Revenue Service; the U.S. Attorneys' Offices; the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Marshall's Service; and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. The heads of these
agencies along with senior officials of the Departments of Justice and Treasury
form the Executive Review Board of the program. Id. The task forces were
comprised of federal, state, and local agencies, and are coordinated by the U.S.
Attorneys' offices in 13 "core" cities. OFFICE OF NATL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
supra note 71, at 86. The OCDETF program targets high-level drug traffickers,
including large-scale money laundering organizations, by achieving collaboration between law enforcement at all levels. Id. at 85-86.
In addition, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 authorized the designation of
certain areas as "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas" (HIDTAs). Id. at 131.
The areas identified as HIDTAs are New York, Miami, Houston, Los Angeles
and the southwest border. Id. The designation entitles the regions to additional federal money that funds federal, state, and local law enforcement initiatives. Id. Of the $86 million budget for fiscal year 1992, $36 million was
distributed to state and local governments operating programs in the designated HIDTAs. Id. at 134.
73. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 established the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund to collect the proceeds of forfeited assets, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 310, 98 Stat. 1837, 2052 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 524(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). Congress amended § 881(e)(1)(A) to provide for this transferred property to go directly to law enforcement:
Whenever property is civilly or criminally forfeited under this subchapter the Attorney General may(A) retain the property for official use or... transfer the property to
any Federal agency or to any State or local law enforcement agency
which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the
property....
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enforcement. Since the 1980s, participation in asset forfeiture
has enabled states and localities to collect assets from drug dealers through the "equitable sharing" component of the federal asset forfeiture program. 74 Given their financially-strapped
budgets, 75 the incentive to pursue forfeitures must have been
even stronger for state and local agencies than for federal law
enforcement. 7 6 In fact, the financial incentives became so compelling that the asset forfeiture process came to be used in some
cases to punish drug dealers to the exclusion of the criminal justice system.7 7 In exchange for the work of non-federal police officers, the federal government has transferred forfeited assets
governments
valued at over one billion dollars to state and local
79
since 1986,78 most of it in the last two years.
Congress's enthusiasm for asset forfeiture seems to reflect
the desire to create new sources of revenue for law enforcement
without increasing taxes.80 In 1991 alone, federal asset forfeitures netted over two billion dollars.8 1 As a political matter, forfeitures please everyone-law enforcement agencies, legislators,
21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1988). Previously the statute required transfer to "the
general fund of the United States Treasury." Id. app. § 881.
74. Participants in joint task forces share most federal forfeiture funds.
See generally supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing task forces).
Equitable sharing gives each participating agency the opportunity to receive an
equitable share of forfeited assets based on its level of participation in the investigation yielding the forfeited assets. In 1991, the DEA recommended the
sharing of over $230 million dollars with state and local law enforcement agencies. See 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 26. The United States government
also shares with foreign countries the proceeds of forfeited assets in exchange
for international cooperation pursuant to 1986 and 1988 amendments to the
forfeiture laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(E)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 46.
75. State budgets have suffered enormous strain from the effects of recession and rising health care costs. The cost of corrections has also risen sharply,
while voters have shown increasing reluctance to accept higher taxes to pay for
institutions like prisons. See Michael de Courcy Hinds, Study Sees PainAhead
in States' Budgets, N.Y. Tms, July 27, 1993, at A6.
76. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 1325-33.
77. Id.
78. 1992 ATrrY GEN. ANN. REP. 44-46.
79. See OFFICE OF NAVL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 71, at 86; 1992
AT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 26-27. In addition, the DEA assumes the costs of investigative overtime for non-federal personnel, which could reach hundreds of
thousands of dollars annually. CHAIKEN ET AL., supra note 69, at 45.
80. 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 2. The Justice Department gave revenue raising as a third reason for the program, see supra text accompanying note
66, but one author suggests this rationale has no basis in the legislative history
of asset forfeiture. See Reed, supra note 29, at 15.
81. Labaton, supra note 49, at Al.
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and the public. Indeed, the drive to raise revenues 8 may
have
2
superseded the other stated goals of asset forfeiture.
Interagency cooperation and creating new sources of revenue to fund drug law enforcement, no matter how highly valued,
should nonetheless be secondary to fundamental fairness in individual cases. In fact, these interests should not conflict. Encouraging multi-jurisdictional cooperation by providing financial
incentives can be accomplished through the equitable sharing
program for assets forfeited through the criminal83 process in addition to a scaled down civil forfeiture program.
III. THE APPARENT REFORMATION OF CIVIL DRUG
ASSET FORFEITURES
The parallel system for punishing drug offenders resulted in
such extreme punishment, upon some relatively minor participants, and, until recently, even upon some completely innocent
people, that both Congress and the Supreme Court have apparently begun to take a harder look at the concept of punishment
by civil forfeiture. In the rush to punish drug offenders as severely as possible and fill law enforcement coffers without tapping government revenues, Congress overlooked two basic
penological principles that normally guide and limit the use of
state power against individuals: mens rea and proportionality
in sentencing.
The overall effect of the Court's decisions and Congress's reforms is to reshape the civil forfeiture process so that, standing
alone, it more justly metes out punishment for drug offenses. In
particular, the Austin case draws a sharp distinction between
remedial and punitive forfeitures, suggesting that punitive forfeitures will be treated as criminal sentences. As discussed infra, however, the new restrictions on the government's power to
punish drug offenders through the civil forfeiture system fall
82. One commentator points to several internal memoranda circulated by
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh and acting Deputy Attorney General Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr. in which they strongly urged federal prosecutors to make
every effort to increase forfeiture revenues in order to meet budget projections.
Id. at A10. Michael Zeldin, a former Justice Department official responsible for
the asset forfeiture office, recently affirmed that, "the desire to deposit money
into the asset forfeiture fund became the reason for being of forfeiture, eclipsing
in certain measure the desire to effect fair enforcement of the laws as a matter
of pure law enforcement objectives." Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 9, at 132533 (discussing law enforcement goals in pursuing asset forfeiture).
83. See infra Part IV (advocating factoring forfeiture into sentencing).
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short of ensuring fair treatment of drug offenders.8 4 As long as
civil forfeiture can be used in addition to criminal punishment,
reformation of civil forfeiture will not eliminate the possibility of
excessive punishment of offenders.

A.

INCORPORATING A MENS

REA

REQUIREMENT: THE INNOCENT

OWNER DEFENSE

The mental element of criminal conduct, or "mens rea," long
considered the bedrock justification for criminal punishment,8 5
had no place in forfeiture jurisprudence until late in our history.
In 1974, the Supreme Court held that a legislature could authorize the forfeiture of illegally-used property even if the owner of
the property was not the wrongdoer and had no knowledge of
the wrongdoing.8 6 The fiction that the forfeiture action proceeded against the "guilty" property rendered the owner's inter8 7
ests virtually irrelevant.
The Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the forfeiture of
a leasing company's property when the company's only wrongdoing had been to lease a yacht. In Calero-Toledov. PearsonYacht
Leasing Co.,88 the government of Puerto Rico seized a pleasure
yacht that Pearson Yacht Leasing leased to two Puerto Rican
residents who possessed one marijuana cigarette.8 9 Pearson
Yacht argued that the forfeiture amounted to a government taking without just compensation because it was an innocent
owner. 90 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, relied on a
historically-based rationale in concluding that the forfeiture of
property from the leasing company did not violate the Fifth
Amendment. 9 1 The earlier decisions on which Pearson Yacht
84. See infra part IV.
85. For a discussion of the importance of mens rea in criminal law compared to its relative insignificance in civil law, see Mann, supra note 28, at
1805-06.
86. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 664-65, 67980 (1974).
87. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing the fiction of
"guilty" property).
88. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
89. Id. at 665, 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
90. The Fifth Amendment prohibits "private property [to] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
91. Id. at 670-90. The Court relied on the line of cases upholding the constitutionality of civil forfeitures used to punish for criminal activity, without
reconsidering the validity of those prior decisions. Early cases upheld the forfeiture of properties and conveyances notwithstanding the innocence of the
owners. See J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505
(1921); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
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rested indicate that the reason for punishing owners without regard to their actual knowledge of wrongdoing rested on notions
of negligence.9 2 In effect, the law imposed a burden on property
owners to take every possible precaution to prevent illegal use of
the property.
The Court did allow a defense for truly innocent owners
whose situations "give rise to serious constitutional questions."93 The Court distinguished between owners who had no
knowledge of the wrongdoing but exercised control in entrusting
the property to others, and property owners who had no such
control. The Court identified two types of truly innocent owners:
those whose property had been taken "without his privity or consent,"9 4 and those who "had done all that
reasonably could be
95
expected to prevent the proscribed use."

Interestingly, the Pearson Yacht case relied on the 1921
Goldsmith-Grantcase in which the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to address the contention that the law might allow "an
ocean steamer [to] be condemned to confiscation if a package of
... liquor be innocently received and transported by it," reasoning that law "ha[d] not yet received such amplitude of application."96 Yet, in Pearson Yacht, the Court upheld this very
result-forfeiture of a yacht from an innocent owner because a
lessee transported a small amount of contraband-without even
acknowledging that the law had arrived at such "amplitude of
application."9 7 Although conveyances had long been subject to
forfeiture without regard to the culpability of the owners, 98 the
inherent unfairness of forfeiture in cases in which the property
owner could prove innocence attracted little public attention until the government's "zero tolerance" campaign.9 9 This campaign drew attention to the forfeitures of valuable yachts
because someone on board possessed a tiny amount of marl92. See Goldsmith-Grant,254 U.S. at 511-12; Dobbin's Distillery, 96 U.S.
at 399.
93. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 689; see also Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801, 2808-2810 (1993) (relying on notion that owner was negligent in allowing his property to be misused).
94. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 689.
95. Id.
96. Goldsmith-Grant,254 U.S. at 512.
97. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 685-90.
98. See Goldsmith-Grant,254 U.S. at 512.
99. Under the Justice Department's "zero tolerance" policy, the government expressed unequivocally its intent to "seize any conveyance containing
illegal drugs, no matter how small the quantity of drugs or how valuable the
conveyance." See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 10, at 1272.
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juana. 0 0° When Congress expanded the forfeiture law in 1978 to
reach drug proceeds, it included an innocent owner defense.' 0 '
It included similar defenses in the provisions for real property in
1984,102 and conveyances in 1988.-03 This long overdue and
fundamental change in forfeiture law recognizes and adjusts for
its penal nature. The "innocent owner" defenses incorporate a
mens rea requirement; the government may not seize property
unless a person has knowingly committed or facilitated a viola04
tion of the criminal laws.
The Supreme Court's recent embrace of this defense in
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.,' 0 5 indicates an uneasiness
with the government's ability to deprive innocent people of their
property rights.' 0 6 The decision severely restricts the government's ability to go behind sham transactions in which owners
claim to be innocent but are in reality in business with the drug
offender. Given the perceived ideological leanings of many of

100. The media has reported a number of instances in which the government seized yachts and other large vessels because they found a minute
amount of marijuana on board. The Los Angeles Times, for example, reported
that agents seized the premier ship of the U.S. oceanographic research fleet
after finding 1/100th of an ounce of marijuana in a crewman's shaving kit, and
confiscated the luxury yacht Monkey Business after discovering 1/28th of an
ounce of marijuana aboard. See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 10, at
1272, 1273 n.89 (citing Savage & Fritsch, U.S. EasesRule on Drug Linked Ship
Seizures, L.A. TIMEs, May 21, 1988, § 2 at 1).
101. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988), authorizes the forfeiture of all proceeds
traceable to a drug offense with the following exception: "no property shall be
forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."
102. The innocent owner defense in § 881(a)(7) real property forfeitures is
worded identically to the drug proceeds defense. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1984); see supra note 99 (discussing drug proceeds).
103. Section 881(a)(4)(c) reads: "no conveyance shall be forfeited under this
paragraph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(c)
(1988).
104. For a discussion of lower court interpretations of the scienter requirements of the innocent owner defenses, see Loomba, supra note 10, at 478-91.
105. 113 S.Ct. 1126 (1993).
106. Numerous commentators have analyzed the shortcomings of the asset
forfeiture provisions in protecting the rights of innocent owners or other third
parties, such as joint tenants, tenants in common, lienholders or mortgagors,
and multiple owners. See generally Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 10;
Jankowski, supra note 10; Loomba, supra note 10; Saltzburg, supra note 10.
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the members of the Court and the suspicious nature of the facts
involved, this case may well have been decided the other way.107
The property owner in 92 Buena Vista received $240,000
from a man with whom she had "maintained an intimate personal relationship" for six years.1 0 8 She purchased a home for
herself and her three children with the money. The government
established that there was probable cause to believe the funds
she used to buy the house were proceeds of illegal drug trafficking.'0 9 Despite her close, long-term relationship with the alleged drug dealer, the property owner claimed to have no
knowledge of the illegal source of the money. 110
The District Court ruled against the home owner on two
grounds. First, the court ruled that the protection for "owners"
applied only to bona fide purchasers for value.L"' The court accepted the government's contention that although § 881(a)(6)
makes no explicit reference to "bona fide purchasers for value,"
courts should nonetheless read the restriction into the definition
of the term. 1 2 The government argued that any other reading
would make it easy for drug dealers to set up sham transfers by
means of gift. 1 3 Because the owner in this case received the
107. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned Right; Reagan's Choices Tip the Balance, N.Y. TmIs, July 7, 1989, at Al (commenting
that "for the first time in a generation, a conservative majority was in a position
to control the outcome on most important issues"); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Shaping
the Court: Reagan is Not the FirstPresident Thwarted by Unpredictabilityof
Issues, and Minds, N.Y. Tntms, July 1, 1988, at Al (citing evidence that Chief
Justice Rehnquist and three Reagan appointees are moving the Court in a conservative direction, although not as conservative as Reagan may have wished);
Tom Wicker, In the Nation; This Radical Court, N.Y. Trbms, June 29, 1991, at
A23 (noting that conservative justices showed a lack of judicial restraint in
overturning constitutional precedents).
108. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1130.
109. Id.
110. Id. The forfeiture involved real property, yet the claim arises under
§ 881(a)(6) because the government contended that the property was purchased
with tainted proceeds. A claim arising under § 881(a)(7) would apply if the
property had been used to commit or facilitate the commission of a drug transaction. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) with § 881(a)(7).
111. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1130.
112. Id. at 1130 n.5. The government did not dispute the broader interpretation of the term "owner," but argued the respondent was not an owner because of the operation of the relation-back doctrine. Id. at 1134; see also infra
notes 118-127 and accompanying text.
113. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S.Ct. at 1137; see also Text of the New 'Relation
Back Doctrine',2 DOJ ALERT, Aug. 1992, at 9 (reprinting the text of a memo
outlining the Department of Justice's policy on the innocent owner defense and
the relation back doctrine written by Cary Copeland, the Director and Chief
Counsel of the Office for Asset Forfeiture).

832

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:805

proceeds used to purchase the home as a gift, she was not con11 4
sidered a bona fide purchaser for value.
The Supreme Court handily disposed of this point by affirming the Third Circuit's decision to reject the limitation to
bona fide purchasers forvalue. The Court could not find support
for this reading in the text of the statute which says nothing
about bona fide purchasers for value.'1 5 Indeed, the Third Circuit found evidence of legislative intent not to limit innocent
owner protection in the fact that the criminal forfeiture statute
contains this restriction," 6 while Congress omitted similar language in § 881.137
A second issue arose from the conflict between two provisions in § 881: the innocent owner defense and the "relation
back" or "taint" doctrine. 1 18 The relation back doctrine is codified at § 881(h): "All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) shall vest in the United States upon
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section." 1 9 Under this doctrine, title to property passes to the government at the time of the illegal act. 120 Because the owner
purchased the property at a point in time after the illegal actsthe purchase proceeds were derived from drug trade-the government had constructively taken ownership of the proceeds
114. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1130.
115. Id. at 1134.
116. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
117. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S.Ct. at 1131 n.8. The government favored the
rule in the criminal forfeiture provision, § 853(c), that gives protection only to
bona fide purchasers for value and disallows the operation of the relation back
doctrine to this group. See Text of the New 'RelationBack Doctrine', supra note
113. Such a rule gives full protection to the type of owners that are truly innocent and would not have notice that the assets might be forfeitable. Id. Because Congress did not write § 881 in this way, the government found itself in
the position of arguing that the doctrine bars an innocent owner defense for
anyone who obtains proceeds after an illegal transaction. 92 Buena Vista, 113
S. Ct. at 1135 n.18.
118. Id. at 1134-37; 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Note, Tempering the Relation Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to
Civil Forfeiturein Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REv. 165 (1990) (arguing that courts
should narrowly construe the relation back doctrine).
119. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988). The statutory rule did not go into effect until
two years after respondent had acquired the property in issue. Therefore, the
government had to rely on both the § 881(h) provision enacted in 1984 as an
amendment to the civil forfeiture statute, and on the common law rule. 92
Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1134-35.
120. This common law doctrine is also codified in other criminal and civil
forfeiture statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2253(b), 2254(g) (1988) (sexual exploitation of minors); 18 U.S.C. § 981(f) (1988) (money laundering, FIRREA
violations).
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prior to their being used to purchase the house. Thus, title to
the house passed to the government at the time of the purchase
12 1
with the tainted money.
The district court applied the relation back doctrine to
trump the respondent's innocent owner defense.' 22 The issue
was whether the court should read the relation back doctrine to
effectively nullify the innocent owner defense for owners of drug
proceeds.' 23 The Third Circuit and Supreme Court rejected this
interpretation.' 2 4 The Supreme Court reasoned that because
the assets in question are proceeds of a drug transaction, by definition they cannot come into an owner's possession until after
the illegal act.' 2 5 Thus, "the Government's submission would effectively eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every
imaginable case in which proceeds could be forfeited." 12 6 The
Court refused to accept an interpretation of the relation back
provision that had the effect of rendering the innocent owner defense meaningless.' 27 Congress scaled back the reach of civil
forfeitures by providing protection for innocent parties, and the
Supreme Court has given that protection the fullest coverage
possible.
B.

INCORPORATING PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: THE EXCESSIVE

FiNEs

CLAUSE OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Austin v. United States12 8 may become a landmark case because in it the Supreme Court developed a previously unexplored area of constitutional law. In a unanimous decision with
two concurring opinions, 12 9 the Court found that a valid issue
existed under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
121. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1134-35.
122. Id. at 1130.
123. Id. at 1134-37.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1135.
126. Id.
127. The Court said, "It seems unlikely that Congress would create a meaningless defense." Id. The decision also rejected the government's argument
that the common law relation-back rule vested perfected title to property in the
government at the time of the illegal act without the requirement of a judicial
condemnation. The Court found that the common law rule required a judicial
determination for title to pass. Id. at 1135-37.
128. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
129. Justice Scalia wrote one concurring opinion; Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, wrote the second. Id. at 2812,
2815.
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Clause.' 3 0 Every other lower court that considered disproportionality claims in forfeiture cases assumed that if the Eighth
Amendment did apply, the cruel and unusual punishment test of
Solem v. Helm should control. 13 The few cases that mentioned
the Excessive Fines Clause merely recited it in the same breath
as the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause without formulating a different test than that under Solem.13 2 The Supreme
Court in Austin, on the other hand, clearly rested its decision
exclusively on the Excessive Fines Clause, making no reference
to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, nor explaining
whether or why different treatment is in order. 133
130. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST., amend VIII. Remarkably, the Court considered the Excessive Fines Clause only once before. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989)
(holding the Excessive Fines Clause does not limit punitive damages award to
private party). Browning-Ferrisexplicitly left open the question of whether the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause applied only in criminal cases. Id.
at 263-64.
131. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983). See, e.g., United States v.
38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 55 (1992) (holding that forfeiture of home does not violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause).
Most courts held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil in rem
forfeiture actions because the Amendment only applies in criminal cases.
These cases generally do not distinguish between particular clauses of the
Amendment. See generally United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814
(8th Cir. 1992) (this case became the Austin case); United States v. One Parcel
of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 206-207 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. On
Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234-35 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Jaffe
v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 364 (1989).
With respect to criminal forfeitures, courts also applied Solem's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment test. See, e.g., United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716,
721-24 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Vriner, 921 F.2d 710, 712-13 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 772 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413-16 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. See, e.g., supra note 131 (citing 38 Whalers Cove Drive).
133. One interpretation of the Court's chosen path would ascribe to it resultoriented considerations. If the Court believed that forfeitures should be subjected to meaningful proportionality review, the cruel and unusual punishment
jurisprudence provided no support. With respect to sentences of imprisonment,
the Court's most recent decision interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), held that the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause contains only limited protection against disproportionate punishment. Id. at 2701-02. The
Harmelin decision upheld a mandatory sentence of life without possibility of
parole for a first-time offender who had possessed 672 grams of cocaine. Id. at
2716 (White, J., dissenting). No other state had imposed such a harsh
mandatory sentence for a drug offense of this severity level. Id. at 2718-19.
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In Austin, the defendant challenged the forfeiture of his
properties as a punishment disproportionate to the severity of
his offense, arguing that the Excessive Fines Clause should apply. 13 4 The government argued that the Eighth Amendment applies only in criminal cases and that civil asset forfeitures
rejected
should not be characterized as criminal. 13 5 The Court
13 6
the government's Eighth Amendment interpretation.
The question of whether courts should reclassify civil forfeitures as criminal in light of their punitive nature has been the

The Court refused to extend the requirement in capital cases that courts
must consider mitigating circumstances to cases involving mandatory life
sentences without possibility of parole, maintaining the bright-line distinction
between death sentences and all other types of punishment. Id. at 2701-02.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia found no proportionality guarantee
at all. Id. at 2686.
Even prior to Harmelin,lower courts applying the Solem test have shown a
disinclination to find gross disproportionality in forfeiture cases, even in cases
that would strike most observers as extreme. See, e.g., United States v. 38
Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding forfeiture of defendant's interest in residence that was "close to three hundred times the total
value of cocaine sold inside it").
134. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 (1993).
135. Id. at 2804. The government argued that the Eighth Amendment
should only apply if the Court reclassified civil asset forfeitures as criminal
under the test set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963),
and United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804. In
Ward, the Court fashioned a two-part test for distinguishing civil and criminal
statutes. The first step is to determine whether Congress intended the statute
to be criminal or civil. If Congress labeled the statute civil, the second step is to
inquire "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49. The Mendoza-Martinez decision lists seven factors that courts should consider in making the civilcriminal determination:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry ....
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
Applying these tests, the Court previously determined that another civil
forfeiture statute was indeed a "civil" provision. See, e.g., United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984). For a thorough discussion
of the application of the Ward test and the Mendoza-Martinez factors to § 881
forfeitures, see Stahl, supra note 9, at 306-37.
136. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
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focus of much discussion. 137 If courts deem civil forfeitures
criminal, they would need to provide all the constitutional protections available to criminal defendants to property owners in
civil forfeiture cases as well. It is argued that the task of punishing criminals, particularly the most serious offenders, is the
essential role of the criminal justice system. In the simplest
terms, however, the unique function of the civil legal system is
to provide a remedy to private parties who have suffered a harm.
Under the current structure, civil drug asset forfeitures lie in
the "middleground" between civil and criminal law, and courts
mete out criminal punishment within the construct of a civil
38
action.1
137. For arguments that civil asset forfeitures under § 881 should be considered criminal proceedings, see Stahl, supra note 9, at 301-37; Schecter, supra
note 10, at 1157-64; Yoskowitz, supra note 10, at 582-92.
138. A number of authors have explored the general theoretical distinction
between the civil and criminal systems. Most recently, Professor Kenneth
Mann explored the use of "punitive civil sanctions," in other words, the use of
civil law to inflict punishment, a purpose normally associated with criminal
law. See Mann, supra note 28, at 1738. Professor Mann refers to a large body
of laws that depart from the paradigmatic criminal and civil law models of law
to form what he calls a "middleground." Id. at 1796-99. He advocates the development of this middleground as an efficient means of handling less serious
criminal offenses. Id. at 1861-62.
Professor Mann includes forfeiture statutes in his discussion of middleground legislation. Id. at 1797-98 (citing property forfeited under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1988, penalties sought under the False Claims Act,
and punitive damages awarded under common law tort principles as examples
of punitive civil penalties). Forfeiture provisions, however, do not have the
same attributes as the other punitive civil sanctions he addresses.
Of singular importance, at least until Austin, forfeiture statutes did not
inflict punishment against individuals to a level that any legal body-be it a
judge, jury, legislature, or administrative agency-had determined to be commensurate with the legal infraction. As a consequence of the in rem nature of
the action, the forfeiture was not structured as a penalty against an individual
that varied according to the seriousness of the offense. Property owners could
lose property, no matter how valuable, upon a finding of a drug violation, no
matter how insignificant. Any violation "taints" any property. See supra notes
47-48 and accompanying text.
In contrast, other "middleground" jurisprudence indicates that courts may
impose multiple damages or money penalties to the extent necessary to inflict
sufficient punishment. See Mann, supra note 28, at 1814-15 (discussing the
principle of "more-than-compensatory monetary sanctions"). Professor Zimring
argues that civil forfeiture statutes are intended to "add more punishment and
deterrence to that imposed in the criminal process and give law enforcers a
second chance at punishment if the criminal prosecution misses its mark."
Franklin E. Zimring, The Multiple MiddlegroundsBetween Civil and Criminal
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901, 1905 (1992). He is probably correct in concluding that
"[a]ny diversion from criminal prosecution would disappoint" the supporters of
forfeiture statutes. Id.; see also Stahl, supra note 9, at 335 (noting survey that
found parallel criminal charges filed in only 20% percent of § 881 cases).
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The Court declined to reconsider the "civil" label attached to
civil asset forfeitures, finding such reconsideration unnecessary
because the Eighth Amendment contains no limitation restricting its application to criminal cases. 13 9 The Court instead
stated that the decisive issue was whether civil forfeitures constitute "punishment" or whether they are "remedial" measures.' 40 The government argued that civil forfeitures are
primarily "remedial" in nature in that they serve to "remove the
'instruments' of the drug trade" and to "compensate the Government for the expense of law enforcement activity and for its expenditure on societal problems such as urban blight, drug
addiction, and other health concerns resulting from the drug
4
trade."' '
The Court flatly rejected these arguments and articulated a
new approach to the remedial-punitive dichotomy. The Austin
approach examines the type of asset seized to determine
whether it is properly characterized as contraband or an instrumentality. 142 The Court previously rejected the characterizaFor two critiques of Professor Mann's proposal to use punitive civil sanctions to scale back the range of criminal law cases, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurringof the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What
Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992); Zimring, supra;see also Mary
M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understandingand Transcendingthe Criminal-CivilLaw Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991) (arguing that criminal-civil law distinction leads to inadequate protection of constitutional rights).
139. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-06. This interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment is not inconsistent with the Court's earlier decision in Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), which found the Eighth Amendment only applicable "to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government." Id. at 664. In Ingraham, the Court held the Eighth Amendment
inapplicable to disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools. Id.; see also
Irene M. Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy,
78 COL. L. REv. 75 (1978) (finding the Court's Eighth Amendment holding
based upon "ambiguous history and dubious precedent"). The application of the
Eighth Amendment to civil drug asset forfeitures, but not to public school disciplinary methods, makes sense because the former, not the latter, is premised on
criminal conduct and prosecuted by government prosecutors.
140. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805-06.
141. Id. at 2811. This argument seems inconsistent with the Justice Department's stated primary objective in pursuing drug asset forfeitures: "to punish and deter criminal activity." 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 1. The Court
noted in Austin that the governments argument also omitted reference to the
legislative history of the civil forfeiture statute in which Congress recognized
the penal nature of civil forfeiture, although it quoted the same passage with
approval in its brief in the earlier case that term, United States v. 92 Buena
Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993), cited in Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 n.13.
142. The Austin approach appears to differ from that of United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). The two situations, however, are also different. In
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tion of a conveyance as a remedial forfeiture of "contraband" in
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, reasoning that,
"[t]here is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile." 143 In Austin, the Court similarly refused to characterize the defendant's home and auto body shop as
"instruments." 144 In other words, it found that real properties
that "facilitate" drug offenses by serving as the location of a
transaction are not "instrumentalities"; their forfeiture is pun145
ishment plain and simple.
The Austin Court rejected the theory that the civil forfeitures at issue are remedial because the forfeiture of property
under § 881 bears no relation to the costs of enforcing the law in
each case. 14 6 To the extent the lower courts attempt to factor in
the enforcement costs, the Court dismissed the government's
theory of general compensation for costs associated with drug
crimes such as "urban blight" and "drug addiction."14 7 Indeed,
the Court rejected any claims by the government for remedial
compensation by means of real property and conveyance
forfeitures.148
Halper, the statute created a fixed fine structure intended to serve a purely
remedial purpose. Its application to an offender who committed many small
violations, however, resulted in a fine far exceeding the governments costs and
damages, qualifying it as "punishment." Id. at 449. The Court found that the
defendant was entitled to an accounting from the government. Id. at 449-50.
The majority held that any fine beyond that which is necessary to make the
government whole would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id.; see also infra part IV.B.1 (discussing double jeopardy in civil
forfeiture cases).
The pivotal distinction between Halper and Austin is that in Austin, the
Court found the forfeitures to serve primarily a punitive purpose. The majority
stated that the "dramatic variations in the value of conveyances and real property forfeitable under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) undercut" any argument that these
constitute a form of liquidated damages. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811-12. Thus,
the fact that they may also serve "some remedial purpose" became irrelevant.
Id. at 2812. The Court relied on the following language in Halper: "[A] civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is
punishment, as we have come to understand the term." Id. (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original). Thus, the Court made no allowance for an accounting by
the government of its costs and damages. Id.
143. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965)).
144. Id. at 2811.
145. As such, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against excessive fines required courts to limit the value of the assets forfeited
according to the crime's severity. Id. at 2811-12.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Because civil forfeitures of real property and conveyances
should be viewed as "payment to a sovereign as punishment for
some offense," 14 9 the Court held that these are "subject to the
limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause." 15 0 The Court remanded this case, and a second case
decided that day,' 5 1 to the lower courts to consider exactly what
limits the Constitution places on the government's power to punish criminal offenders by means of financial penalties, in cash or
in kind. 152
The long overdue recognition that the government's use of
punitive civil forfeiture should be limited in proportion to the
severity of the offense, however, does not rationalize the punishment of drug offenders in the federal system. The Austin case
does nothing that explicitly factors forfeiture punishment into
the sentencing decision-making process; Austin only requires
that punishment imposed by means of civil forfeiture be limited
in accordance with the Excessive Fines Clause.
IV. FACTORING FORFEITURES INTO THE
SENTENCING CALCULUS
Federal drug laws authorize the government to file civil actions to seize property while also filing criminal charges. At sentencing for criminal drug offenses, courts need not formally
factor any civil forfeitures into the decision-making process.
Consequently, criminal sentences for drug offenders that do not
take into account civil forfeitures are per se too harsh and may
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 15 3 The following sections
149. Id. at 2812 (citing Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
150. Id.
151. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
152. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin suggests an excessiveness test
that would undercut the desire to achieve proportionality. His position is that
civil forfeitures should be treated differently from monetary fines or criminal
forfeitures, relying on the time-worn fiction that the property is the guilty
party. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring). Rather than consider the value of the property, Justice Scalia stated that, "[tihe relevant inquiry for an excessive forfeiture under § 881 is the relationship of the property
to the offense: Was it close enough to render the property, under traditional
standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable?" Id. at 2815.
The majority responded to Justice Scalia's proposal in a footnote: "We do
not rule out the possibility that the connection between the property and the
offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way limits the Court of
Appeals from considering other factors in determining whether the forfeiture of
Austin's property was excessive." Id. at 2812 n.15.
153. See infra notes 182-196 (discussing double jeopardy concerns).
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propose reforms that would begin to harmonize fairness concerns with the government's interest in pursuing an aggressive
campaign against drug offenders.
A.

LIMITING CML FoRFEITURES TO CASES OF NECESSITY

In general, a rule of necessity should define the scope of civil
asset forfeitures. Ideally, Congress should limit civil forfeitures
to the cases in which an expedient civil forfeiture process is necessary: remedial forfeitures and those in which the government
cannot obtain in personam jurisdiction over the suspected drug
offender. These limitations preserve the important interests of
law enforcement in reaching illegitimate assets that would
otherwise be beyond their reach and assuring fairness to the
wrongdoer. In contrast, punitive forfeitures should be left to
criminal courts in the exercise of their sentencing authority. As
less satisfactory alternatives, the Sentencing Commission could
amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines fine provisions to fac54
tor punitive civil forfeitures into their sentencing decisions,'
or, if that change is not made, individual sentencing courts
should make it a practice to consider the value of punitive civil
forfeitures when deciding on the appropriate criminal forfeiture
155
or fine and prison sentence.
1.

Distinguishing Remedial and Punitive Forfeitures

The Austin decision identifies two types of punitive civil forfeitures: forfeitures of conveyances and forfeitures of real
properties that facilitate drug offenses. 15 6 As such, these assets
should be forfeitable only as part of a criminal sentence. 57 This
154. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines include a requirement that courts
consider the consequences of civil actions in sentencing organizations. See

U.S.S.G., supra note 26, at § 8C2.8(a)(3).
155. Federal courts have the authority to depart from the sentence range
specified by the Guidelines if they find that, "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in
a sentence different from that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see also
U.S.S.G., supra note 26, at 5-6 (discussing the sentencing ranges specified by
the Guidelines).
156. 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
157. It is worth mention that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
civil forfeiture of conveyances and real properties served to compensate the government for the costs of law enforcement. To be considered remedial, a civil
forfeiture must serve a purely remedial purpose. As Congress designed these
forfeitures in part as punitive measures, they could not be characterized as remedial. Austin, 113 S. Ct., at 2811-12; see also supra note 141 (discussing this
aspect of the Austin decision). Thus, the government may no longer rely on this
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change would require Congress to abolish §§ 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7). These properties would instead be forfeited through the
criminal forfeiture provision found in 21 U.S.C. § 853. This provision already allows for the forfeiture of any property that facilitates a drug offense upon conviction for the offense. In order to
prevent the transfer or hiding of these assets, Congress should
amend the seizure provisions of § 853 to give prosecutors greater
158
leeway to take possession of properties prior to conviction.
In contrast, the civil procedure for the forfeiture of contraband, the instrumentalities of drug manufacturing and distribution, serves a purely remedial purpose and should be
maintained. 15 9 It is beyond peradventure that law enforcement
should not be hindered in its removal of drugs or other illegal
substances and equipment. Officers should not have to wait until after a conviction to seize cocaine found in a car or the equipment used to make LSD found in a factory.
As a matter of necessity as well as principle, civil forfeitures
of traceable proceeds should also be permitted. 160 Drug profits
do not legitimately belong to the person who possesses them.
Their forfeiture is purely remedial, has no sentencing implica16
tions, and thus does not raise Eighth Amendment concerns. '
Moreover, the forfeiture of proceeds would often elude law enforcement if the civil process is not available. In many airport
cases, for example, federal law enforcement officers will discover
a passenger carrying a large sum of cash who they believe is
involved in the drug trade. 1 62 The cash will often be subjected to
theory in seizing these types of properties. See, e.g., United States v. 835 Seventh Street, 832 F. Supp. 43, 48-49 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that an unconstitutionally excessive civil forfeiture may not be saved by selling the subject
premises and then remitting only a portion of the proceeds to the government).
158. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text (discussing the shortfalls
of § 853).
159. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(1)-(3) (controlled substances, raw materials,
equipment and containers); (a)(5) (books and records); (a)(8)-(9) (controlled substances and listed chemicals). 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
160. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
161. See supra notes 128-152 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth
Amendement).
162. The DEA has developed "drug courier profiles" for use in interdiction
efforts in airports and train stations. If a passenger fits a particular profile,
officers will stop the person to ask about the person's itinerary, to see identification, and to ask for consent to search the person's belongings and sometimes the
person's body. In addition to profiles, officers rely on information provided by
airlines or railway companies such as whether a passenger purchases tickets
with cash or whether the person is travelling from a "source city." See, e.g.,
Sandra Guerra, Domestic Drug Interdiction Operations: Finding the Balance,

842

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:805

a drug-detecting dog sniff, and in many cases the dog will react
positively to traces of some narcotic substance. 6 3
The officers can establish probable cause that the money
was derived from drug transactions to meet the burden of proof
for civil forfeiture. 164 . The totality of the circumstances often
gives a court sufficient reason to believe that the cash was not
legitimately earned.' 65 In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the traveler would be given the opportunity to establish the legitimate
source of the money if one exists. For one who holds the money
legitimately-perhaps by inheritance, by earning it through a
legitimate profession, or by winning a lottery-evidence to prove
the money's source should be easy to obtain and, if shown, would
surely be conclusive. Thus, the interests of innocent owners are
sufficiently protected in the civil forfeiture context.
If the officers are required to proceed through the criminal
process, forfeiting the money only after conviction, their efforts
will be frustrated in airport drug proceeds cases. The officers
cannot charge the individual with a crime even if they have reason to believe the person is involved in the drug trade. Possession of the cash is not a crime per se, nor will the officers be able
to establish that a particular drug transaction took place or who
was involved.
When drug proceeds are used to purchase assets such as
real property or conveyances, the forfeiture of those assets
presents different considerations than the forfeiture of the proceeds themselves, but in the final analysis, these assets should
also be civilly forfeitable. The seizure of homes, however, can
cause extreme hardship by depriving owners of essential assets.
The fact that the process can produce such hardship creates a
need for safeguards against erroneous seizure to protect inno82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1118-21 (1992) (describing DEA drug courier profile operations).
163. For a discussion of the use of narcotics detection dogs, see id. at 115055.
164. See United States v. $37,780 in United States Currency, 920 F.2d 159,
164 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding falsity of traveler's statements and evidence of extensive involvement in drugs established probable cause to believe forfeiture
action could be maintained); United States v. $91,960.00, 897 F.2d 1457, 1462
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding a "large sum of money, unexplained and in conjunction
with the presence of drug paraphernalia, may constitute evidence of probable
cause"); United States v. $38,600.00 in U.S. Currency, 784 F.2d 694, 698 (5th
Cir. 1986 (same); cf United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (holding
DEA agents had "reasonable suspicion" to stop an airport passenger who had
large sum of money and behaved in other suspicious ways).
165. In determining whether law enforcement had probable cause, courts
must make a situation-specific inquiry. See, e.g., supra note 164 (citing cases).
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cent occupants from sudden dislocation. Because real estate is
the type of asset that cannot easily be removed or transferred, it
should be possible to fashion procedural rules to minimize the
potential for undue hardship for innocent parties, without frustrating government efforts.
2. Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction
The procedure for seizing and forfeiting the assets of
criminals emerged out of the need 16 6 to permit the government
to enforce civil judgments and exact criminal penalties against
individuals 16 7 outside the jurisdictional reach of American
courts.' 68 This concern continues to the present day and civil
forfeiture law should reflect it.
166. As noted by the Supreme Court in 1844, forfeiture of property under
admiralty law "is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate
means of suppressing the [offense] or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the
injured party." United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233
(1844).
167. Private parties who were victims of criminal acts of piracy invoked the
in rem forfeiture actions developed in admiralty law to obtain restitution. See,
e.g., Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233 (holding private parties who were
victimized could claim property that the government acquired); The Palmyra,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 8 (1827) (in rem proceeding against ship involved in
piracy).
168. According to principles of international law and considerations of Fifth
Amendment Due Process, a federal court may not hear a criminal action unless
the person charged with the crime stands before the court when the trial begins. U.S. CONST. amend. V; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 422(2) (1986) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT). This becomes particularly troublesome when the court is attempting to bring foreign or
fugitive drug defendants to trial. A grand jury can indict a non-present defendant, but an arrest warrant can only be served within the United States or by a
request for extradition to the asylum country in the case of a defendant found
abroad. Id. § 422 cmt. c(iii).
Although extradition exists as an option in theory, it is not a convenient
procedure in practice. Extradition from an asylum country requires two conditions to be met. First, the United States must have "jurisdiction to prescribe,"
defined as the authority of a state to make substantive laws applicable to particular people and circumstances. See Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction
Acts of Terrorismand Nonimmunity for ForeignViolators
Over Extraterritorial
of InternationalLaw Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 191, 201 n.39 (1983). The government may obtain jurisdiction to prescribe by establishing that any of five types of jurisdiction apply: territorial
jurisdiction, national jurisdiction, protective jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction,
or passive personality or victim theory jurisdiction. See generally id. at 201-03
(describing general principles of jurisdiction under international law.) Most
cases arise under territorial jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction is established
if the individual committed the offense in the United States or if the defendant's extraterritorial actions had an actual or intended effect in the United
States. See generally id. at 203-04 (describing territorial jurisdiction).
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The earliest forfeiture statutes allowed for the forfeiture of
foreign ships whose crews were alleged to have smuggled contraband into the United States or to have engaged in piracy. 16 9 The
Palmyra case' 70 and United States v. Brig Malek Adhel'71 involved forfeitures of ships whose crews engaged in piracy. In
both cases, the crews of foreign-owned vessels engaged in acts of
aggression against American ships.' 7 2 Lacking jurisdiction to
In addition, the government must satisfy a second requirement, 'jurisdiction to enforce," defined as the power to induce or compel compliance with its
laws. RESTATEmENT, supra, § 401(c). A federal court can only act in the territory of another country with the consent of that country. Treaties establish
consent in advance, and commonly list five characteristics that must be met in
order to extradite: there must be cause for holding the person for trial, the
offense must not be a "political offense", the offense must be within the jurisdiction to prescribe by the requesting state, the offense must be considered a crime
in both the requesting and asylum state ("dual criminality"), and extradition
must not violate principles of double jeopardy. Id. at § 476. Finally, extradition
must also meet the concept of "specialty," meaning that a person can only be
tried for the crime for which he was extradited. Id. at § 477.
Consent can also be obtained on an ad hoc basis. One ad hoc approach is
known as "The International Comity of Nations." United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886). Under this doctrine, a state voluntarily surrenders
a fugitive from justice. 31 AM. JuR. 2D Extradition§ 21 (1989). Today comity is
rarely used due to the numerous extradition conventions and treaties to which
the United States is a party. Id.
The requirements of dual criminality and specialty have posed problems for
the United States in seeking extradition from some countries. Other countries,
such as Iran and Afghanistan, do not have treaties with the United States. The
United States on some occasions has resorted to more expedient methods of
apprehension, such as irregular rendition and abduction, but these methods
raise a host of other diplomatic problems. See generally Sandi R. Murphy, Note,
Drug Diplomacyand the Supply-Side Strategy: A Survey of United States Practice, 43 VAD. L. REv. 1259, 1294-1300 (1990) (discussing extraordinary methods of apprehension of foreign offenders).
169. The civil forfeiture statutes as we know them today are usually considered to have originated from British admiralty law. In disputes between maritime traders, the owners of the vessels were likely to live abroad and thus
outside the jurisdiction of the court. The in rem civil action provided a convenient way to resolve maritime disputes. See Stahl, supra note 9, at 295; see also
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. at 2807-08 (stating that of three types of
forfeiture used in England, only statutory forfeitures such as those found in the
navigation acts and used to enforce revenue or customs laws took hold in this
country).
The principle of forfeiture of guilty property has been traced back to biblical
times. For a thorough discussion of forfeitures and deodands, see Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169
(1973).
170. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
171. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
172. Apparently, the private parties who had been victimized could claim
the property so acquired by the government. Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at
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prosecute the owner of the Palmyra for the actions of the
crew, 173 if indeed the government could have shown that the
owner had commissioned the crimes, the government brought a
civil forfeiture action under the Piracy Act of 1819 instead. Justice Story's majority opinion in Malek Adhel comments on the
necessity rationale for bringing civil actions in rem:
It is not an uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law of
nations, to treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master or
crew thereof, a wrong or [offense] has been done as the offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility
of the owner thereof. And this is done from the necessity of the case, as
the only adequate means of suppressing the [offense] or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party. The doctrine also is familiarly applied to cases of smuggling and other misconduct .... 174

These early cases, then, responded to an otherwise unremediable situation by proceeding against the property of a foreign owner to provide some recompense to American victims of
piracy. Similarly, in the smuggling cases, forfeiture of the vessel
that transported the contraband provided the only means of
punishing and deterring the foreign ship owner from smuggling.
There was a need for an extraordinary measure to allow the government to punish a person over whom the government could
not obtain personal jurisdiction. The fiction of the in rem proceeding-the action directly against the offending property itself-lent itself to the situation.
As a policy matter, modern civil drug asset forfeitures
should continue to be allowed to punish extraterritorial defendants. Congress should address this problem directly, however,
by enacting a special provision that would allow the civil forfeiture of any property of a suspected drug offender who is outside
the jurisdiction of American courts. Given the international nature of the drug trade, a drug dealer's assets may be located
within the United States while the offending owner is abroad or
has become a fugitive. Although the government can prove an
individual committed a drug offense in the United States, if the
individual cannot be found within the United States borders, a
civil action against the property of the individual may provide
the only practical recourse for the enforcement of the drug
5
laws.17
233. This feature has not been retained in modem civil drug asset forfeitures.
See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 166.
174. Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233.
175. See supra note 166.

846

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:805

Civil drug asset forfeiture laws, however, authorize forfeiture in the routine case in which the government will also prosecute a defendant criminally.' 7 6 The authority to entertain a
civil drug asset forfeiture action does not turn on the existence of
in personam jurisdiction over the alleged criminal. In the routine case, forfeitures should be limited to those involving purely
remedial ends.' 7 7 In contrast, both punitive and remedial forfeiture should be allowed in cases of extraterritorial suspects.' 7 8
These changes should not have any bearing on interagency
cooperation.' 7 9 To the extent that future revenues might decrease, any decrease would most likely reflect a correction of
previous forfeitures that courts allowed prior to the Austin requirement of proportionality review. If the decrease that this
correction causes is so drastic as to leave law enforcement inadequately funded, the legislature always has the option of direct
federal finding.
B.

RESERVING PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMINAL COURTS

By restricting punitive forfeitures except as criminal
sentences, 8 0 Congress could consolidate the punishment phase
for drug offenses into a single sentencing proceeding held in
criminal court after conviction. For reasons of judicial economy
alone, one might expect the government to prefer a single, consolidated criminal action to determine guilt or innocence and to
decide the extent of punishment to be imposed. Consolidation of
the punishment phases in one post-conviction sentencing proceeding will allow courts to make better-informed, rational
decisions.
176. In Austin, for example, the defendant had already been convicted and
sentenced in state criminal court before the federal government initiated a civil
forfeiture action against his home and business. Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993).
177. See supra part III.B.
178. Situations may arise in which property is forfeited in a punitive civil
case on the ground that the suspect has become a fugitive or is an unextraditable foreign national, and later the government obtains in personam jurisdiction and files a criminal action. Procedures for discounting the criminal
sentence by the amount of the punitive forfeiture can be devised, although subsequent prosecution may run afoul of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause. See infra notes 180-196 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
180. The proposal that this Article sets forth would allow the continued use
of punitive forfeiture in cases in which the suspected drug offender is outside
the jurisdictional reach of the court or has become a fugitive. See supra Part
IVWA
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At present, prosecutors in many drug cases seek civil drug
asset forfeitures prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings.
Because sentencing occurs after the civil forfeiture proceeding,
the government has already seized whatever assets the person
once owned by the time he or she is sentenced. This eliminates
the possibility of imposing any financial penalty as a criminal
sentence. At sentencing, the court reviews a Probation Officer's
pre-sentence investigation report which frequently reports an
"inability to pay" fines, without necessarily indicating to the
court that the defendant's poverty is the result of civil forfeiture.' 8 1 The sentencing court then determines the applicable
imprisonment range and forgoes any financial penalty or asset
forfeiture.
This Article proposes that only criminal courts should impose punitive sanctions. Drug offenders who possess real property or conveyances would face forfeiture of these assets through
criminal forfeiture, in addition to the possibility of a monetary
fine and prison sentence. Together with consolidating and rationalizing criminal sentencing, this proposal offers two other advantages. First, it avoids the double jeopardy challenges that
inevitably will follow from the Austin decision that characterizes
certain forfeitures as punishment. Furthermore, it provides
criminal courts with a new and potentially potent sentencing option that could reduce the need for incarceration. The following
sections address these advantages and also consider the costs of
overpunishment that society will continue to bear if reform is
not forthcoming.
1.

Double Jeopardy Considerations

The Austin decision may foretell a future Court ruling that
the Double Jeopardy Clause permits punishment for a crime to
be imposed either at a civil forfeiture proceeding or at sentencing, but not both. 1 82 The Court noted in Austin that the Double
Jeopardy Clause had not been applied in civil forfeiture cases,
181. Presentence investigation reports give courts additional information
pertinent to the sentencing decision. Probation officers are required to prepare
these reports in every case. See FED. R. CRni. P. 32(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
182. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that, "Nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. V. In addition, to prohibiting double prosecution, the clause
also provides protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516 (1990) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849
(1993).
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and, almost in passing, added, "but only in cases where the forfeiture could properly be characterized as remedial." 183 It follows logically from the Court's finding that the forfeiture of real
property and conveyances are punitive, and that civil forfeiture
to criminal sentencing violates the
of these items in addition
84
Double Jeopardy Clause.When the government brings both a criminal action and a
civil forfeiture action in a drug case,' 8 5 the question is whether
the second punishment constitutes multiple punishment for the
same offense.' 8 6 Until recently, the test articulated in United
183. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805 n.4 (citing United States v. One Assortment
of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984)); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.
United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (per curiam); see generally United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446-49 (1989) (holding Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits a second sanction that may not fairly be characterized as remedial).
184. It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
three types of abuses of prosecutorial power: a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440;
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165
(1977); Pearce,395 U.S. at 717.
185. It makes no difference for double jeopardy purposes whether the criminal case is brought before the civil case or vice-versa. See Philip S. Khinda,
UndesiredResults Under Halper and Grady: Double Jeopardy Bars on Criminal RICO Actions Against Civilly-Sanctioned Defendants, 25 COLUM. J. L. Soc.
PROBS. 117, 148 (1991).
186. Presumably, the civil and criminal cases are predicated on the "same
offense." The Supreme Court set forth the approach for interpreting the phrase
"same offense" in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The Blockburger decision states that "the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not." Id. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S.
338, 342 (1911)); see also Brown, 432 U.S. at 168 (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for lesser included offense and greater offense).
Because civil forfeitures are premised on proof of a violation of the criminal
drug laws, prosecution for the same criminal law will clearly constitute the
same offense. For example, the forfeiture of conveyances requires proof that
the vehicles were "used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner
to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment" of controlled substances or the materials used to manufacture or transport them. 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988).
Of course, prosecutors might try to fashion their cases so that two different
provisions of Title 21 are the bases for the civil and criminal cases. For example, the prosecutor might premise the civil forfeiture action on the possession of
drug manufacturing equipment and might premise the criminal indictment on
the drug sale, even though only one transaction is at issue. The Coures decision in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), eliminated this loophole, but was
recently overruled. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2852 (1993).
In Grady, the Court created a second double jeopardy requirement. Even if
the offenses satisfied the Blockburger test, Grady held that, in addition, the
Double Jeopardy Clause barred any subsequent prosecution in which the
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States v. Ward determined whether a civil sanction constituted a
punishment or a remedy.' 8 7 In effect, the Ward test makes the
Double Jeopardy Clause inapplicable unless a court finds that
Congress did not mean what it said when it labeled a statute
"civil," a finding courts should be reluctant to make. 8 8
The landmark case of United States v. Halper discarded this
approach and applied the double jeopardy clause to a civil proceeding for the first time.'8 9 The civil statute in Halper could in

charge requires proof of "conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted." Grady, 495 U.S. at 521. The decision in
Dixon again focuses the inquiry on a technical analysis of the elements of the
statutes charged, rather than on the actual conduct involved. See generally
Khinda, supra note 185 (criticizing the Grady approach and suggesting it results in chilling impracticalities for law enforcement authorities); George C.
Thomas, IH, A Modest Proposalto Save the Double Jeopardy Clause, 69 WASH.
U. L.Q. 195 (1991) (proposing to narrow Grady's "same culpability" test);
Ramona L. McGee, Note, CriminalRICO and Double JeopardyAnalysis in the
Wake of Grady v. Corbin Is This RICO's Achilles' Heel?, 77 CommmL L. REv.
687 (1992) (analyzing the Grady test as applied to RICO).
187. 448 U.S. 242 (1980). Two Supreme Court cases examined the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeiture actions brought after acquittals on criminal charges arising from the same offenses. United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, the Court considered whether the forfeiture constituted a second "criminal punishment." 409 U.S. at 235. Thus, both
the criminal and the punitive nature of the statute were at issue. The Court
found the statute was serving a remedial purpose in providing "a reasonable
form of liquidated damages for violation of the inspection provisions and
serv[ing] to reimburse the Government for investigation and enforcement expenses." Id. at 237. The second issue was whether the measure of recovery was
"so unreasonable or excessive that it transform[ed] what was clearly intended
as a civil remedy into a criminal punishment." The court held it was not. Id.
By the time the Court decided One Assortment of 89 Firearmsin 1984, it
had developed the Ward test for distinguishing civil from criminal statutes,
which it found critical to the double jeopardy inquiry. United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168-169 (1963) (listing factors relevant to the punitive-remedial analysis).
This test does not differ substantially from the One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
test, although it is somewhat more exacting because it incorporates the seven
Mendoza-Martinez factors. See supra note 135 (listing seven factors).
188. The test requires courts to determine Congress's intent in enacting the
law, and if they find the intent was to create a civil remedy, then courts are
required to consider whether the statute is "'so punitive... as to negate' Congress' intent to establish a civil remedial mechanism." One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). The Ward test has
also been used to determine whether other constitutional provisions were applicable. See supra note 135.
189. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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no way be construed as criminal under the Ward test. 190 Yet the
particular application of the statute resulted in a fine well in
excess of that which would be appropriate to meet the government's remedial purposes. 1 91 Thus, had the Court applied the
Ward test in Halper, the government would not have been
barred from imposing both criminal punishment and the large
civil fine, even though the civil fine could only be construed as
punitive.
The Halper decision frames the "sole question" as "whether
the statutory penalty ...constitutes a second 'punishment' for
the purpose of double jeopardy analysis." 192 The Court disposed
of prior case law by finding their "relevant teaching" to be "that
the Government is entitled to rough remedial justice" and that it
"without being
may use "imprecise formulas" to fix damages 193
deemed to have imposed a second punishment."
Moreover, the Court rejected the Ward approach as "not
well suited to the context of the 'humane interests' safeguarded
by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple punishment"; thus, "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance." 194 The Court instead applied a "rule of
reason":
Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and
the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational
relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but
rather appears to qualify as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the
word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact
constitutes a second punishment.1 95
190. The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731, provides a remedy for
the filing of false claims and imposes liability for a civil penalty of "not less than
$5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus three times the amount of damages the
Government sustains because of the act of that person, and costs of the civil
action." 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988). The Court stated this provision should ordinarily be construed as a civil remedial measure. 490 U.S. at 449 ("Similarly, we
have recognized that in the ordinary case fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages
provisions can be said to do no more than make the Government whole.").
191. As manager of New City Medical Laboratories, Irwin Halper submitted
false claims to an insurance company for reimbursement for services rendered
on 65 separate occasions. The claims demanded reimbursement in the amount
of $12 each, when the actual service only entitled the laboratory to $3 per claim.
490 U.S. at 437. The insurance company passed the overcharges along to the
federal Medicare program. The total sum of the overcharges was $585. Id.
Under the formula for fines of the False Claims Act, Halper was subject to a
fine of over $130,000. Id. at 438.
192. Id. at 441.
193. Id. at 446.
194. Id. at 447.
195. Id. at 449-50.
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Applying the Halper approach, it follows that the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar the imposition of punitive civil forfeitures
in combination with a second punishment in criminal court. 196
2. Criminal Forfeiture as an Intermediate Punishment
In the ordinary case, the government should bring punitive
forfeitures as part of the criminal sentence. Section 853 already
requires courts to forfeit a defendant's assets upon conviction for
a drug offense, but the current structure does not distinguish
between remedial and punitive forfeitures, nor does it give the
sentencing court the discretion to fashion sentences consistent
with the defendant's ability to bear the financial penalty. 97
Courts should allow punitive forfeitures in criminal court only to
the extent that they reflect the severity of the offense, as the
Austin case implies. 198 Consistent with the Court's determination that the forfeiture of conveyances and real property used to
facilitate offenses constitute punishment for crime, Congress
should amend § 853 to distinguish between remedial and punitive forfeitures. The sentencing structure should fully incorporate those forfeitures that serve to punish, giving courts much
more discretion to choose between types of punishment than the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines presently allow.' 99 Punitive
196. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the Court also ignored the
Ward test in its excessive fines analysis in Austin. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. The Court has shown a preference for the punitive-remedial
test for judging civil penalties under both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the
Excessive Fines Clause. It stands to reason that the Court will apply the same
analysis to its double jeopardy analysis of punitive forfeitures.
In cases in which the federal government initiates a punitive forfeiture action and the state court files a criminal action based on the same offense, as was
the case in Austin, the Court may find that the "dual sovereignty exception" to
the Double Jeopardy Clause allows the imposition of the second punishment.
Although a thorough exploration of this exception is beyond the scope of this
Article, see generally Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty Exception
To Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 383 (1986) (analyzing
the historical development and contemporary significance of the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy).
197. For a description of the scope and operation of the criminal forfeiture
provisions of Title 21, see supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
198. See supra part LI.B (discussing the Austin decision).
199. The guidelines applicable to drug offenses reflect the mandatory minimum sentences that Congress created, which require lengthy prison terms for
all drug offenses. See Freed, supra note 7, at 1690 n.45; Gary T. Lowenthal,
Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate
Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 86-87 (1993).
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criminal forfeitures could serve as intermediate sanctions 200 in
20

the same way that fines could be punishment for crimes. '
The suggestion that courts should factor forfeitures into the
sentencing decision raises the same equity concerns that have
prevented fine programs from being implemented as meaningful
intermediate sanctions. The suggested use of financial penalties
to punish for crimes is inevitably criticized as unfair to the indigent on the ground that the poor could not benefit from this option and would be subject to incarceration instead. Although a
full treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article,
Professors Norval Morris and Michael Tonry thoroughly explored and flatly rejected this concern in their book, Between
20 2
PrisonAnd Probation.
Professors Morris and Tonry believe that using financial
penalties interchangeably with incarceration does not pose an
equity problem. 20 3 Their sensible proposal would tailor the financial penalty to each offender's means, earning capacity, and
financial obligations to dependents, so as to impose "roughly
200. "Intermediate sanctions," sometimes called "alternatives to incarceration," comprise punishment options that lie between the fully incapacitating
option of imprisonment and the option of ordinary probation, which is thought
to impose few restrictions on an offender's liberty. Intermediate sanctions include fines, community service orders, house arrest, intermittent imprisonment, electronic monitoring, and probation with conditions such as requiring
treatment. See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PRO.
BATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 17680 (1990) (listing menu of punishment options).
201. The typical understanding of the purpose of fines is to punish and deter
crime, not to serve as a means of dispossessing criminals of ill-gotten gains,
which would be a purely remedial purpose. See SALLY T. HImLSMAN ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINES IN SENTENCING: A STUDY OF THE USE OF THE FINE AS A

CRIMINAL SANCTION 21-28 (Nov. 1984).

202. See MORRIS & ToNRY, supra note 200, at 82-149 (exploring the interchangeablity of punishments and the use of fines as an intermediate
punishment).
203. They persuasively argue in favor of the interchangability of punishments both in principle and in practice. MORRIS & ToNRY, supra note 200, at
35-108.
The Supreme Court has struck down as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause the use of incarceration in lieu of payment of fines by poor people. The
Court held such laws worked an invidious discrimination against individuals on
the basis of indigency. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 674 (1983); Tate
v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243-44
(1970).
Financial penalties tailored to a person's means, with the alternative of
community service for the truly indigent, would avoid the equal protection issues in those cases. See Richard Posner, Optimal CriminalSanctions, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205, 209 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing Supreme Court
decisions in Tate and Williams were incorrect).
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comparable financial burdens."20 4 As between rich and poor defendants, the dollar amounts of fines or forfeitures may vary
even if their criminal histories and offenses of conviction are the
same. This inequality is not problematic if our concern is to exact the same amount of punishment. Courts can only impose
roughly equivalent financial hardships on rich and poor defend20 5
ants by making rich defendants pay more than poor ones.

The use of financial penalties to punish poor people poses no
practical problems either. Studies of fine collection programs indicate that even relatively poor people pay their fines as ordered. 20 6 With the addition of criminal forfeiture as an
204. MORRIS & ToNRY, supra note 200, at 114, 141. Congress requires the
consideration of these and other factors in determining the ability of a defendant to pay a fine. The relevant provision of the Sentencing Reform Act reads as
follows:
In determining whether to impose a fine, and the amount, time for payment, and method of payment of a fine, the court shall consider, in
addition to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1) the defendant's income, earning capacity, and financial resources;
(2) the burden that the fine will impose upon the defendant, any person who is financially dependent on the defendant, or any other person
(including a government) that would be responsible for the welfare of
any person financially dependent on the defendant, relative to the burden that alternative punishments would impose;
(3) any pecuniary loss inflicted upon others as a result of the offense;
(4) whether restitution is ordered or made and the amount of such
restitution;
(5) the need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains from
the offense;
(6) whether the defendant can pass on to consumers or other persons
the expense of the fine; and
(7) if the defendant is an organization, the size of the organization and
any measure taken by the organization to discipline any officer, director, employee, or agent of the organization responsible for the offense
and to prevent a recurrence of such an offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) (1988).
205. We can learn much from the day fine systems of the Swedish and
Germans in thinking about structuring a system of financial penalties. As summarized by Morris and Tonry, "'t]henumber of day-fine units must be decided
first by the sentencing court without regard to the means of the offender; the
value of each day-fine unit is them calculated." MORRIS & ToNRY, supra note
200, at 143. In practice, the Swedish and German systems operate very differently due to the difference in the way they calculate the offender's ability to
pay. Id. These and other American day fine models should influence the development of an integrated punishment system for drug offenders as well as other
types of offenders.
206. Morris and Tonry reject the idea that the poor cannot pay fines, and
give numerous examples of successful programs that have calibrated fines according to an offender's ability to pay. Id. at 112-15; see also SILVIA S.G. CASALE
& SALLY T. HILISMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ENFORCEMENT OF FINEs AS
CRImINAL SANCTIONS: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO AMERICAN PRACTICE (Nov. 1986) (concluding that fines can be collected from even poor
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intermediate sanction, courts would have the option of a financial penalty that would not entail any enforcement problems because they would know about the defendant's assets at
sentencing and forfeiture could occur immediately after sentencing. The utterly destitute would not necessarily suffer more severe punishment under this type of system. Even the poorest
defendants can have a "fine on time" imposed, such as commu20 7
nity service, rather than a financial penalty.
A drug sentence might include a package of punishments
such as a period of incarceration, fines, or forfeiture of assets
such as cars and other items, and perhaps other intermediate
sanctions such as community service. Courts can fashion intermediate sanctions to reflect the seriousness of the offense while
reducing reliance on prison sentences to the exclusion of other
forms of punishment. 20 Because many drug offenders do not
pose a threat of violence requiring incapacitation, this group is
20 9
appropriately targeted for intermediate sanctions.
The imposition of financial penalties on drug offenders
would not change existing policy. Congress has already endorsed the efficacy of financial disincentives for drug offenders
when it enacted the civil and criminal forfeiture and criminal
offenders when set rationally in relation to means based on a study of English
courts); HrLSMAN ET.AL., supra note 201 (discussing the use of fines in other
countries; DOUGLAS C.McDONALD ET. AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DAY FINES IN
AMERICAN COURTS: THE STATEN ISLAND AND MILWAUKEE EXPERIMENTS (Apr.
1992) (reporting results of an experiment using day fines that tailor an offender's fine to his or her ability to pay); George F. Cole, Fines Can Be Fineand Collected, 28 JUDGES' J. at 5 (Winter 1989) (arguing for greater use of fines
as sanctions in criminal cases).
207. See MoRRIs & TONRY, supra note 200, at 123-24.
208. Good sense and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the
Sentencing Commission and charged it with the creation of Guidelines, require
these considerations. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (1988). The Act charges the Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately
reflect the seriousness of the offense." § 994(m). The statute also requires the
Commission to "take into account the nature and capacity of the penal, correctional, and other facilities and services available" in promulgating guidelines.

§ 994(g).
209. See J. Michael Quinlan, Intermediate Punishments as Sentencing Options, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 217 (1992) (former director of Federal Bureau of Prisons advocating increased reliance on intermediate sanctions for non-violent
offenders to redress overcrowding that stiffer laws cause). In Sweden in 1979,
courts imposed fines in 734 narcotics cases, and in significant numbers of other
serious offenses such as homicide, sexual offenses, and robbery. MoRRs &
TONRY, supra note 200, at 144.
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fine provisions. 21 0 The changes suggested here would merely acknowledge that punitive forfeitures are punishment for crime in
the hopes of encouraging a more comprehensive analysis of drug
sentencing.
CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for a comprehensive approach to drug sentencing in federal court. The plethora of recent Supreme Court
forfeiture decisions indicates a desire on the Court's part to reexamine the entire civil forfeiture process. The decisions of the October 1992 term, in particular, will work substantial changes in
the way drug offense forfeitures operate, specifically the Austin
requirement of proportionality review. Rather than making
piecemeal changes to conform the civil forfeiture process to satisfy the mandates of the Supreme Court, however, Congress
should thoroughly investigate the relationship between the
criminal sentencing and civil forfeiture processes. Only a single,
comprehensive system of punishment will rationalize drug sentencing in federal court.
A few simple changes in the civil forfeiture law would restrict the imposition of punitive forfeitures except as criminal
sentences. These changes would consolidate the imposition of
punishment into one criminal sentencing forum. This would
eliminate the problem of excessive punishment that occurs when
drug offenders receive punishment through both the criminal
and civil courts for the same offense. These changes would also
eliminate the possible double jeopardy dilemma in this arrangement. Congress could easily fashion procedures to protect the
210. The 1986 Act that raised drug offense fines to millions of dollars produced no legislative history on the rationale for the increases. The legislative
history of an earlier amendment increasing the drug offense fine provisions,
however, suggests that the legislative intent of the increase was to deprive drug
offenders of illegitimate profits. In 1984, Congress increased fines for drug offenses from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of thousands for the following purpose:
Drug trafficking is enormously profitable. Yet current fine levels are,
in relation to the illicit profits generated, woefully inadequate. It is not
uncommon for a major drug transaction to produce profits in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. However, with the exception of the most
recently enacted penalty for domestic distribution of large amounts of
marihuana, the maximum fine that may be imposed is $25,000. Part A
of Title V provides more realistic fine levels that can serve as appropriate punishments for, and deterrents to, these tremendously lucrative
crimes.
S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 225 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.AN. 3437-38.
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properties subject to criminal forfeiture from being transferred
or hidden, thereby satisfying an important concern of law enforcement. At the same time, the availability of punitive forfeitures as an intermediate sanction creates another sentencing
option that could serve as a means of reducing our reliance on
imprisonment.
Impressive advances in the investigation and prosecution of
drug crimes by prosecutors and law enforcement officials have
gone unnoticed due to all the negative publicity given to cases of
forfeiture abuses. Of special significance are the multi-jurisdictional task forces that have effectively coordinated the efforts of
law enforcement on all levels of government. These institutional
coalitions were born out of a desire to curb the drug trade, but
can serve as models for multi-jurisdictional cooperation to attack other pervasive problems. Statutory changes would promote a fairer and more rational system and would allow the
public to focus on the positive aspects of drug control in this
country.
Most importantly, a comprehensive assessment of the punishment of drug offenders could address the concerns of overpunishment that have resulted in overcrowded federal prisons
and numerous other unfortunate consequences. It is not only
drug offenders who suffer when the system inflicts excessive
punishment. We all pay the price, and we cannot afford to continue on this course. In particular, forfeitures of real property,
although not requiring financial outlays, nonetheless have social
costs. When legitimate businesses are forfeited to the government, innocent employees lose their jobs. They suffer emotional
harm and the financial strain of unemployment, and they may
require welfare support. When the homes of drug offenders are
forfeited, their families may be left homeless.
The logic of current sentencing practices is analogous to the
fallacious belief that if two aspirins will cure a headache in an
hour, four aspirins will cure it in half of an hour. No amount of
punishment will ever "cure" our drug problem, but one thing is
certain: an overdose of punishment does more harm than good.

